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Abstract
We study the evolution of a social norm of “cooperation” in a dynamic environment.
Each agent lives for two periods and interacts with agents from the previous and next
generations via a coordination game. Social norms emerge as patterns of behavior
that are stable in part due to agents’ interpretations of private information about
the past, influenced by occasional commonly-observed past behaviors. For sufficiently
backward-looking societies, history completely drives equilibrium play, leading to a
social norm of high or low cooperation. In more forward-looking societies, there is a
pattern of “reversion” whereby play starting with high (low) cooperation reverts toward
lower (higher) cooperation. The impact of history can be countered by occasional
“prominent” agents, whose actions are visible by all future agents and who can leverage
their greater visibility to influence expectations of future agents and overturn social
norms of low cooperation.
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1 Introduction
The contrast between social and political behaviors in the south of Italy and the north,
pointed out by Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993), provides a prominent example of multiple
self-reinforcing (stable) patterns of behavior or social norms. Banfield’s study in the south
revealed a pattern of behavior corresponding to a lack of “generalized trust” and an “amoral
familism.” Both Banfield and Putnam argued that because of cultural and historical reasons
this social norm, inimical to economic development, emerged and persisted in many parts of
the south but not in the north, ultimately explaining the divergent economic and political
paths of these regions. Banfield also suggested that this pattern was an outcome of “the
inability of the villagers to act together for their common good” (p. 32).
Such social norms are not cast in stone, however. Rather, they emerge and change as a
result of social and historical factors, and can also be influenced by “leadership” — in partic-
ular, the visible actions of prominent individuals, the subject of our analysis.1 For example,
distrust between blacks and whites was a major aspect of social relations in South Africa,
cemented by the harsh policies of the apartheid regime. One of the defining challenges for the
new South African democracy, holding its first multi-racial elections in 1994, was to break
this distrust. Many of the actions of South Africa’s new president and leader of the African
National Congress, Nelson Mandela, can be interpreted as using his prominence to switch
society to a more cooperating, trusting social norm. Mandela not only gave speeches advo-
cating reconciliation, emphasizing the place of the white minority in the hoped-for “Rainbow
Nation”. But even more prominently, he presented the 1995 Rugby World Cup trophy to the
South African national team, the Springboks, wearing their jersey, even though the team
had long been hated by black South Africans and become a symbol of apartheid. Other
symbolic gestures by prominent individuals have had equally long-lasting effects on social
norms and expectations. Examples include George Washington’s refusal to be considered for
a third term in office, which changed the beliefs of many leading contemporaries who viewed
the presidency as a form of monarchy (e.g., Wood, 2010) and enshrined the limited tenure
of US presidents, as well as Mahatma Gandhi’s actions emphasizing non-violent resistance
and religious tolerance against the background of mounting internal religious tensions and
potential violent resistance to British colonialism.
Our main contribution is to develop a model in which the dynamics of behavior emerge
along a single equilibrium with evolving beliefs over time, which allows us to study the role of
1Locke (2002) provides examples both from the south of Italy and the northeast of Brazil, where starting
from conditions similar to those emphasized by Banfield, trust and cooperation emerged at least in part as
a result of leadership and certain specific policies (see also Sabetti, 1996).
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actions by prominent agents in driving and changing social norms. Our analysis clarifies when
history-determined social norms are likely to emerge, and how they can change endogenously
in response to prominent agents who coordinate the expectations of different players. We
also show that in some situations social norms will have a natural dynamic whereby greater
cooperative behavior or trust following certain salient events or actions will be endogenously
eroded.
Our framework also formalizes the notion that social norms constitute distinct frames of
reference that coordinate agents’ expectations, and shape the interpretation of the informa-
tion they receive and thus their behaviors. A particular social norm, for example generalized
trust, can persist because the expectation that others will be honest leads agents to interpret
ambiguous signals as still being consistent with honest behavior and thus overcoming occa-
sional transgressions. In contrast, a social norm of distrust would lead to a very different
interpretation of the same signals and a less trusting pattern of behavior.
To communicate our main contribution in the clearest fashion, we focus on a coordina-
tion game with two actions: “High” and “Low”. High actions can be thought of as more
“cooperative”. This base game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria, and the one involving
High actions by both players leads to higher payoffs for both players. We consider a society
consisting of a sequence of players, each corresponding to a specific “generation”.2 Each
agent’s payoff depends on her action (which is decided at the beginning of her life) and the
actions of the previous and the next generation. Agents only observe a noisy signal of the
action by the previous generation and so are unsure of the play in the previous period —
and this uncertainty is maintained by the occasional presence of agents who find it domi-
nant to play High or Low behavior. In addition, a small fraction of agents are prominent.
Prominent agents are distinguished by the fact that their actions are observed perfectly by
all future generations. This formalizes the notion of shared (common) historical events and
enables us to investigate conditions under which prominent agents can play a leadership role
in changing social norms.
We show that a greatest equilibrium, which involves the highest likelihood of all agents
choosingHigh behavior, always exists as does a least equilibrium. The greatest (as well as the
least) equilibrium path exhibits the behavior we have already hinted at. First, depending on
the shared (common knowledge) history of play by prominent agents, a social norm involving
most players choosing High, or a different social norm where most players choose Low, could
emerge. These social norms shape behavior because they set the frame of reference: what
2The assumption that there is a single player within each generation is adopted for simplicity and is
relaxed in Section 5.
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agents expect those in the past to have played, and those in the future to play, are governed
by the prevailing social norm. So, the past history when coupled with equilibrium behavior
sets a prior belief about the past and future play of others. Because they only receive
noisy information about past play, agents interpret the information they receive according
to the prevailing social norm as determined by the shared (common) history.3 For example,
even though the action profile (High, High) yields higher payoff, a Low social norm may
be stable, when agents expect others in the past to have played Low (e.g., distrust between
blacks and whites in South Africa, even though they would be better off with a more trusting
approach to race relations). In particular, the first agent following a prominent Low play will
know that at least one of the two agents she interacts with is playing Low, and this is often
sufficient to induce her to play Low. The next player then knows that with high likelihood
the previous player has played Low (unless she was exogenously committed to High), and
so the social norm of Low becomes self-perpetuating. Moreover, highlighting the role of
the interplay between history and expectations in the evolution of social norms, in such an
equilibrium even if an agent plays High, a significant range of signals will be interpreted as
coming from Low play by the next generation and will thus be followed by a Low response.
This naturally discourages High, making it more likely for a Low social norm to persist.
When prominent agents are rare, these social norms can last for a long time.
Second, except for the extreme settings we have just discussed in which all endogenous
agents follow the action of the last prominent agent, behavior fluctuates between High
or Low as a function of the signals agents receive from the previous generation. In such
situations, society tends to a steady-state distribution of actions. Convergence to this steady
state exhibits a pattern that we refer to as reversion. Starting with a prominent agent who
has chosen to play High, the likelihood of High play monotonically decreases as a function
of the time elapsed since the last prominent agent (and likewise for Low play starting with a
prominent agent who has chosen Low). The intuition for this result is as follows: An agent
who immediately follows a prominent agent, let us say the period 1 agent, is sure that the
previous agent played High, and so the period 1 (endogenous) agent will play High.4 The
period 2 agent then has to sort through signals as it could be that the period 1 agent was
exogenous and committed to Low. This makes the period 2 (endogenous) agent’s decision
sensitive to the signal that she sees. Then in period 3, an endogenous agent is even more
reluctant to play High, as now he might be following an exogenous player who played Low
3History is summarized by the action of the last prominent agent. The analysis will make it clear that
any other shared understanding, e.g., a common belief that a specific action was played at a certain point in
time, could also play the same role.
4This is true unless all endogenous non-prominent agents playing Low is the only equilibrium.
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or an endogenous agent who played Low because of a very negative signal. This continues
to snowball as each subsequent player then becomes more pessimistic about the likelihood
that the previous player has played High and so plays High with a lower probability. Thus,
as the distance to the prominent agent grows, each agent is less confident that their previous
neighbor has played High. Moreover, they also rationally expect that their next period
neighbor will interpret the signals generated from their own action as more likely to have
come from Low play, and this reinforces their incentives to play Low.
Third and most importantly, this setting enables us to formally study leadership-driven
changes in social norms. We show that prominent agents can counter the power of history
by exploiting their visibility to change the prevailing social norm from Low to High. In
particular, starting from a social norm involving Low play — as long as parameters are not
so extreme that all Low is locked in — prominent agents can (and will) find it beneficial to
switch to High and create a new social norm involving High play. The greater (in fact, in
our baseline model, perfect) visibility of prominent agents means that: (i) they know that
the next generation will be able to react to their change of action, and (ii) the prominent
action is observed by all future agents who can then also adjust their expectations to the new
norm, thus further incentivizing the next generation to play High. Both the understanding
by all players that others will also have observed the action of the prominent agent (and the
feedback effects that this creates) and the anticipation of the prominent agent that she can
change the expectations of others are crucial for this type of leadership.
Social norms and conventions and their dynamics are the focus of several important
literatures. First, the literature on dynamic and repeated games of incomplete information
has studied how reputations affect behavior, and the conditions for the emergence of more
cooperative equilibria (see, e.g., Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, for an excellent overview). For
example, Tirole (1996) develops a model of “collective reputation” in which an individual’s
reputation is tied to her group’s reputation because her past actions are only imperfectly
observed.5 Tirole demonstrates the possibility of multiple steady states and shows that
bad behavior by a single cohort can have long-lasting effects.6 Second, the evolutionary
5Also related is Tabellini (2008) who, building on Bisin and Verdier (2001), endogenizes preferences in a
prisoners’ dilemma game as choices of partially-altruistic parents. The induced game that parents play has
multiple equilibria, leading to very different stable patterns of behavior in terms of cooperation supported
by different preferences. See also Doepke and Zilibotti (2008) and Galor (2011) for other approaches to
endogenous preferences.
See also Jackson and Peck (1991) who show the role of the interpretation of signals, history, and expecta-
tions as drivers of price dynamics in an overlapping generations model.
6Other notable recent examples include Bidner and Francois (2013) who model the interactions between
tolerance towards political transgressions, which is itself shaped by social norms, and choices by political
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game theory literature has studied the dynamics of social norms extensively (see Young,
2010, for a recent survey). In particular, Young (1993), Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993)
and numerous papers building on their work study evolutionary models where equilibrium
behavior in a coordination game played repeatedly by non-forward-looking agents follows
a Markov chain and thus results in switches between patterns of play.7 Third, our model
is related to repeated games with overlapping generations of players or with asynchronous
actions (e.g., Lagunoff and Matsui, 1997, Anderlini, Gerardi and Lagunoff, 2008).
Our contribution relative to this extensive literature on the evolution of social norms
comes from the modeling and analysis of the role of prominent agents and leadership-driven
changes in social norms. This analysis is enabled by the forward-looking players in our
framework. In particular, we examine how a single prominent individual can leverage her
prominence to shape future expectations and behavior. She affects not only those with whom
she directly interacts, but also future generations. In particular, it is this (common) knowl-
edge that future generations will share this observation that enables a prominent individual
to affect social norms. This contrasts with other models of forward looking behavior in which
individuals only account for their direct impact.8 The “social structure of prominence” is
new and plays a major role in our model: generations share common observation of a par-
ticular leader and that prominence enables her to change the behavior of future generations.
We are also not aware of any equivalent of our reversion result in the previous literature: for
certain parameter values, there are mean-reverting dynamics of expectations and behavior
that are still completely consistent with equilibrium and do not undermine initial reactions
to prominent play.
There is also a literature that models leadership, though mostly focusing on leadership in
leaders; and Belloc and Bowles (2013) who examine the interaction between conventions and institutions.
7As examples, Azur (2004) models the dynamic process of tipping in an evolutionary context. Argenziano
and Gilboa (2010) and Steiner and Stewart (2008) emphasize the role of history as a coordinating device in
equilibrium selection, but using an approach in which expectations are formed on the basis of a similarity
function applied to past history (thus more similar to the non-forward-looking behavior in models of evolution
and learning in games). Diamond and Fudenberg (1989), Matsuyama (1991), Krugman (1991), and Chamley
(1999) discuss the roles of history and expectations in dynamic models with potential multiple steady states
and multiple equilibria, and are thus also related.
A more distant cousin is the growing global games literature (e.g., Carlsson and Van Damme (1993),
Morris and Shin (1998), Frankel and Pauzner (2000), and Burdzy, Frankel and Pauzner (2001)). However,
this literature is not concerned with why groups of individuals or societies in similar economic, social and
political environments end up with different patterns of behavior and why there are sometimes switches from
one pattern of behavior to another.
8For instance, Ellison (1997) infuses one rational player into a society of fictitious players and shows that
the rational agent has an incentive to be forward looking in sufficiently small societies. See also Blume (1995)
and Matsui (1996) for other approaches to the evolution of play in the presence of rational players.
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organizations (e.g., Hermalin, 2012, Myerson, 2011). The notion of leadership in our model,
which builds on prominence and observability, is quite different from — and complementary
to — the emphasis in that literature.9
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses several applica-
tions that motivate our approach and its assumption. Section 3 presents the model. Section
4 contains our main results. Section 5 clarifies the role of prominence in coordinating expec-
tations and considers several extensions. Section 6 concludes. Appendix A contains the main
proofs, while Appendix B, which is available online, presents additional material, including
some motivating examples, and proofs omitted from the paper and Appendix A.
2 Applications
We begin with a few examples of applications and settings that fit within our model and
help motivate the questions and the analysis that follows.
2.1 Cooperation
The canonical application motivating many of our ideas is one of societal cooperation. Sup-
pose that cooperation decisions are taken within the context of a partnership with payoffs:
Cooperate Not Cooperate
Cooperate β, β −α, 0
Not Cooperate 0,−α 0, 0
where α, β > 0. This payoff matrix implies that it is a best response for an individual to
cooperate when his partner is doing so and this yields the highest payoff to both players.
However, not cooperating is also a Nash equilibrium. When cast in the context of a proper
dynamic game, non-cooperation can thus emerge as a “social norm”.
The simplest way of placing these interactions into a dynamic setting is by using an
overlapping-generations framework, where each individual plays this game with an agent
from the previous generation and one from the next generation. We introduce “stickiness”
in dynamic behavior by assuming that each agent chooses a single action, which determines
9A recent empirical paper by Borowiecki (2012) investigates long-run persistence of preferences for cultural
goods, such as classical music, which require coordinated demand/support for their production. Borowiecki
finds that the local birth of prominent classical composers in the renaissance is a significant predictor of
current provision of cultural goods in Italian provinces today. He finds that a standard deviation increase
of prominent composer births within a province in the renaissance correlates with a 0.4 standard devia-
tion increase in current cultural goods provision. Although one can imagine other explanations for such
observations, it is a thought-provoking finding with respect to the persistent impact of prominent behaviors.
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her payoffs in both of her interactions. We also introduce incomplete information, so that
each individual will be acting on the basis of a noisy signal about the action of the previous
generation (and realizes that the next generation will observe a noisy signal of his action).
This allows for play to persist, but also to change over time. Prominent agents will be those
whose actions can be seen (without or with less noise) by future generations.
2.2 Conflict and Trust between Two Groups
A related model can be used to capture the dynamics of conflict and trust between two
groups, such as black and white South Africans. We could think of players from each group
taking turns (as in Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2013). If payoffs are given by the cooperation
game above, this can lock in the social norm of conflict and distrust between the two groups.
In this light, our discussion of Nelson Mandela’s leadership can be viewed as a switch by
a prominent agent to cooperation, even when he believed that whites at the time were not
cooperating and were expecting blacks not to cooperate.
2.3 Collective Action
Consider the following model of collective political action. A state is ruled by an autocrat
who can be forced to make concessions if citizens protest in an organized manner. Society
has an overlapping generations structure as already described in the context of our previous
applications, but with each generation population by n agents. To maximize similarity
with our other applications, suppose also that the country consists of n “neighborhoods”,
and each agent is assigned to a neighborhood (see Section 5 for essentially the same model
without the neighborhood structure). Suppose that the concessions the autocrat makes
are neighborhood-specific (e.g., reduce repression or make public good investments in that
neighborhood), so directly, each agent only cares about the his or her neighborhood.
Each agent has a choice: protest or not. We assume that an agent who is the only one
who protests within his neighborhood — i.e., a young agent protesting when the old agent
in the same neighborhood does not, or an old agent doing so when the next generation does
not — incurs an expected cost of α > 0 (e.g., this could be the product of the probability
of getting caught times the disutility from the punishment by the autocrat). If two agents
protest in the neighborhood, then they are able to force the hand of the autocrat, and receive
a per person per period gain of β > 0. In addition, an agent who protests when young can
be caught and punished when old even if he does not protest in the second period of his
life. If this probability, say p′, is sufficiently close to the probability of getting caught when
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protesting, p, then an agent who protests in youth will also do so in old age.
This implies that the payoff matrix for the interaction between an old and the young
agent can then be represented as
Protest Not Protest
Protest β, β −α, 0
Not Protest 0,−α 0, 0
This is identical to the payoff matrices in our other applications.
In addition, individuals are uncertain, but observe informative signals about whether oth-
ers are protesting: the young receive a signal of past play (either of a randomly-chosen agent
from the previous generation or from the behavior of the agent in the same neighborhood).
For instance, the noise in the signal could come from autocrats’ natural tendency to make
it difficult to observe unrest. This results in a dynamic game of incomplete information as
in our baseline model.
Prominence now has a clear counterpart as actions by agents who visibly protest and can
serve to coordinate the expectations of future generations. In fact, in Section 5 we will return
to a variation on this example (though without the neighborhood structure) and interpret
prominent agents as those that coordinate protests across a number of regions.
2.4 Other Applications
Our framework is based on three features:
• complementarities in actions across individuals,
• some stickiness in an individual’s behavior across time due either to an up-front in-
vestment cost, switching costs, or possible liability from past actions, and
• incomplete information about the actions of others at the time of decision-making.
Clearly, there are many additional applications that have these features including, among
others, complementary investments (e.g., in partnerships or in matches); the leading of an
army (with prominent leaders seen as leading an attack); tax avoidance or more generally
law-breaking (as the probability of being caught may be lower when others also breaking the
law), and the choice of general social values and morals that are taught to children (whether
to be honest or not). Although our baseline model and the applications discussed here are
in terms of the coordination game, in Section 5 we also show that much of the analysis and
insights extend to applications where the stage game takes the form of a prisoner’s dilemma.
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3 The Model
We consider an overlapping-generations model where agents live for two periods. We suppose
for simplicity that there is a single agent born in each period (generation). This is extended
to a setting with more individuals within each generation in Section 5. Each agent’s payoffs
are determined by her interaction with agents from the two neighboring generations (older
and younger agents). Figure 1 shows the structure of interaction between agents of different
generations.
Agent 0
Agent 1 
Agent 2 
Agent 3 
t=0 1 2 3
Figure 1: Demographics
3.1 Actions and Payoffs
The action played by the agent born in period t is denoted At ∈ {High, Low}. An agent
chooses an action only once. The stage payoff to an agent playing A when another agent
plays A′ is denoted u(A,A′). The total payoff to the agent born at time t is
(1− λ)u(At, At−1) + λu(At, At+1), (1)
where At−1 designates the action of the agent in the previous generation and At+1 is the
action of the agent in the next generation. Therefore, λ ∈ [0, 1] is a measure of how much
an agent weighs the play with the next generation compared to the previous generation;
when λ = 1 an agent cares only about the next generation’s behavior, while when λ = 0
an agent cares only about the previous generation’s actions. The λ parameter thus captures
discounting as well as other aspects of the agent’s life, such as what portion of each period
the agent is active (e.g., agents may be relatively active in the latter part of their lives, in
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which case λ could be greater than 1/2).10 In our baseline analysis, we take u(A,A′) to be
given by the following matrix:
High Low
High β, β −α, 0
Low 0,−α 0, 0
where β and α are both positive. This payoff matrix captures the notion that, from the
static point of view, both (High,High) and (Low,Low) are static equilibria given this
payoff matrix — and so conceivably both High and Low play could arise as stable patterns
of behavior. (High,High) is clearly the payoff-dominant or Pareto optimal equilibrium.11
3.2 Agents, Signals and Information
There are two characteristics of agents in this society.
First, agents are distinguished by whether they choose an action to maximize the utility
function given in (1). We refer to those who do so as “endogenous” agents. There are also
some committed or “exogenous” agents who will choose an exogenously given action. This
might be because these “exogenous” agents have different preferences, or because of some
irrationality or trembles. Any given agent is exogenous type with probability 2pi, and such
an agent is exogenously committed to playing each of the two actions, High and Low, with
probability pi (and all of this, independently of all past events). Throughout, we assume
that pi ∈ (0, 1
2
), and in fact, we think of pi as small (though this does not play a role in our
formal results). With the complementary probability, 1 − 2pi > 0, the agent is endogenous
and chooses whether to play High or Low when young, and is stuck with the same decision
when old.
Second, agents can be either “prominent” or “non-prominent” (as well as being either
endogenous or exogenous). A noisy signal of an action taken by a non-prominent agent of
generation t is observed by the agent in generation t+ 1. No other agent receives any infor-
mation about this action. In contrast, the actions taken by prominent agents are perfectly
10This parameter incorporates tastes such as discounting, which may in turn be influenced by savings
and investment technologies and other social factors. It may also proxy for other dimensions of social
organization. For example, if one society has a higher retirement age than another, this will change the
relative time one spends with agents of various ages. These aspects are all rolled into a single parameter
here for parsimony and expositional simplicity.
11Depending on the values of β and α, this equilibrium is also risk dominant, but this feature does not play
a major role in our analysis. We also note that the normalization of a payoff of 0 for Low is for convenience,
and inconsequential. In terms of strategic interaction, it is the difference of payoffs between High and Low
conditional on expectations of what others will do that matter, which is then captured by the parameters α
and β.
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observed by all future generations. We assume that each agent is prominent with proba-
bility q (again independently of other events) and non-prominent with the complementarity
probability, 1 − q. This implies that an agent is exogenous prominent with probability 2qpi
and endogenous prominent with probability (1− 2pi)q.
The different types of agents and their probabilities in our model are thus:
non-prominent prominent
endogenous (1− 2pi) (1− q) (1− 2pi) q
exogenous 2pi (1− q) 2piq
Unless otherwise stated, we assume that 0 < q < 1 so that both prominent and non-
prominent agents are possible. We refer to agents who are endogenous and non-prominent
as regular agents.
We now explain the information structure in more detail. Let ht−1 denote the public
history at time t, which includes a list of past prominent agents and their actions up to and
including time t− 1, and let ht−1 denote the last entry in that history. In particular, we can
represent what was publicly observed in any period as an entry with value in {High, Low,N},
where High indicates that the agent was prominent and played High, Low indicates that the
agent was prominent and played Low, and N indicates that the agent was not prominent.
We denote the set of ht−1 histories by Ht−1.12
In addition to observing ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, an agent of generation t, when born, receives
a signal st ∈ [0, 1] about the behavior of the agent of the previous generation, where the
restriction to [0, 1] is without loss of any generality (clearly, the signal is irrelevant when the
agent of the previous generation is prominent). This signal has a continuous distribution
described by a density function fH (s) if At−1 = High and fL (s) if At−1 = Low. Without
loss of generality, we order signals such that higher s has a higher likelihood ratio for High;
i.e., so that fH(s)
fL(s)
is non-decreasing in s. To simplify the analysis, we maintain the assumption
that fH(s)
fL(s)
is strictly increasing in s, so that the strict Monotone Likelihood Ratio Principle
(MLRP) holds, and we take the densities to be continuous and positive.
Let Φ (s, x) denote the posterior probability that At−1 = High given st = s under the
belief that a (non-prominent) agent of generation t− 1 plays High with probability x. Then
Φ (s, x) ≡ fH (s)x
fH (s)x+ fL (s) (1− x) =
1
1 + (1−x)
x
fL(s)
fH(s)
. (2)
The game begins with a prominent agent at time t = 0 playing action A0 ∈ {High, Low}.
12As will become clear, it is irrelevant whether a prominent agent was exogenous or endogenous in the
greatest or least equilibrium in our model, though such information could be used in other equilibria as a
correlating device.
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3.3 Strategies, Semi-Markovian Strategies and Equilibrium
We can write the strategy of an endogenous agent of generation t as:
σt : Ht−1 × [0, 1]× {P,N} → [0, 1],
written as σt(h
t−1, st, Tt) where ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 is the public history of play, st ∈ [0, 1] is the
signal observed by the agent of generation t regarding the previous generation’s action, and
Tt ∈ {P,N} denotes whether or not the the agent of generation t is prominent. The number
σt(h
t−1, st, Tt) corresponds to the probability that the agent of generation t plays High. We
denote the strategy profile of all agents by the sequence σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σt, . . .) .
We show below that the most relevant equilibria for our purposes involve agents ignoring
histories that come before most recent prominent agent. These histories are not payoff-
relevant provided others are following similar strategies. We call these semi-Markovian
strategies.
Semi-Markovian strategies are specified for endogenous agents as functions σSMτ : {High, Low}×
[0, 1]×{P,N} → [0, 1], written as σSMτ (a, s, T ) where τ ∈ {1, 2, . . .} is the number of periods
since the last prominent agent, a ∈ {High, Low} is the action of the last prominent agent,
s ∈ [0, 1] is the signal of the previous generation’s action, and again T ∈ {P,N} is whether
or not the current agent is prominent.
With some abuse of notation, we sometimes write σt = High or Low to denote a strategy
or semi-Markovian strategy that corresponds to playing High (Low) with probability one.
We analyze Bayesian equilibria, which we simply refer to as equilibria. More specifically,
an equilibrium is a profile of endogenous players’ strategies together with a specification of
beliefs (conditional on each history and signal) such that: the endogenous players’ strategies
are best responses to the profile of strategies given their beliefs (conditional on each possible
history and signal) and given their prominence; and beliefs are derived from the strategies
and history according to Bayes’ rule. Since 0 < q < 1 and pi > 0, all feasible histories
and signal combinations are possible, and the sets of Bayesian equilibria, perfect Bayesian
equilibria and sequential equilibria coincide.13
13To be precise, any particular signal still has a 0 probability of being observed, but posterior beliefs are
well-defined subject to the usual measurability constraints.
When q = 0 or pi = 0 (contrary to our maintained assumptions), some feasible combinations of histories
and signals have zero probability and then Bayesian and perfect Bayesian equilibria (appropriately defined
for a continuum of signals) can differ. In that case, it is necessary to carefully specify which beliefs and
behaviors off the equilibrium path are permitted as part of an equilibrium. For the sake of completeness, we
provide a definition of equilibrium in Appendix A that allows for those corner cases.
12
4 Equilibrium
We start with a few observations about best responses and then move to the characterization
of the structure of equilibria.
4.1 Best Responses
Given the utility function (1), an endogenous agent of generation t will have a best response
of A = High if and only if
(1− λ)φtt−1 + λφtt+1 ≥
α
β + α
≡ γ, (3)
where φtt−1 is the (equilibrium) probability that the agent of generation t assigns to the
agent from generation t− 1 having chosen A = High. φtt+1 is defined similarly, except that
it is also conditional on agent t playing High. Thus, it is the probability that the agent of
generation t assigns to the next generation choosing High conditional on her own choice of
High. Defining φtt+1 as this conditional probability is useful; since playing Low guarantees
a payoff of 0, and the relevant calculation for agent t is the consequence of playing High,
and will thus depend on φtt+1.
The parameter γ encapsulates the payoff information of different actions in an economical
way.14 In what follows, γ (rather than α and β separately) will be the main parameter
affecting behavior and the structure of equilibria.
4.2 Existence of Equilibria
We say that a strategy σ is a cutoff strategy if for each t, ht−1 such that ht−1 = N and
Tt ∈ {P,N}, there exists ct(ht−1, Tt) such that σt(ht−1, s, Tt) = 1 if s > ct(ht−1, Tt) and
σt(h
t−1, s, Tt) = 0 if s < ct(ht−1, Tt).15 Clearly, setting σt(ht−1, s, T ) = 1 (or 0) for all s is a
special case of a cutoff strategy.16
We can represent a cutoff strategy profile by the sequence of cutoffs
c =
(
cN1 (h0), c
P
1 (h0), ...c
N
t (ht−1), c
P
t (ht−1), ...
)
,
14In particular, γ is a measure of how “risky” the High action is — in the sense that it corresponds to
the probability that the other side should be playing High to make a player indifferent between High and
Low. Put differently, it is the “size of the basin of attraction” of Low as an equilibrium.
15Note that specification of any requirements on strategies when s = ct(h
t−1, Tt) is inconsequential as this
is a zero probability event.
16If ht−1 = P , the agent of generation t receives no signal, and thus any strategy is a cutoff strategy.
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where cTt (ht−1) denotes the cutoff by agent of prominence type T ∈ {P,N} at time t con-
ditional on history ht−1. In what follows, we define “greatest equilibria” using the natural
Euclidean partial ordering in terms of the (infinite) vector of equilibrium cutoffs.
Proposition 1 1. All equilibria are in cutoff strategies.
2. There exists an equilibrium in semi-Markovian cutoff strategies.
3. The set of equilibria and the set of semi-Markovian equilibria form complete lattices,
and the greatest (and least) equilibria of the two lattices coincide.
The proof of this proposition relies on an extension of the well-known results for (Bayesian)
games of strategic complements to a setting with an infinite number of players, presented in
Appendix A. The proof of this proposition, like those of all remaining results in the paper,
is also provided in Appendix A.
Given the results in Proposition 1, we focus on extremal equilibria. Since the lattice of
equilibria is complete there is a unique maximal (and hence greatest or maximum) equilib-
rium and unique minimal (and hence least or minimum) equilibrium. Because, again from
Proposition 1, these extremal equilibria are semi-Markovian, their analysis will be quite
tractable. As is generally the case in this class of models, non-extremal equilibria can be
much more complicated, and we will not focus on them.
We further simplify the exposition by focusing on the greatest equilibrium since each
statement has an immediate analog for the least equilibrium, which we omit for brevity.
4.3 A Characterization of Greatest Equilibrium Play
The structure of equilibria depends on the values of the parameters λ, γ, pi, q, and the
signal structure. To provide the sharpest intuitions, we focus on two key parameters: λ,
which captures how forward/backward looking the society is, and γ ≡ α/ (β + α), which
designates how risky playing High is (in the sense defined in the footnote 14).
The next figure summarizes the structure of equilibria simply as a function of γ (also
fixing λ). This figure shows that the structure of equilibria will in general depend on the play
of the last prominent agent. For example, when it is High, there is a key threshold, γ
H
, such
that for γ ≤ γ
H
, there is a social norm where all endogenous agents play High regardless of
their signal. Above this threshold, a High social norm is no longer an equilibrium. As High
becomes riskier (γ increases), generations immediately following a High prominent player
will play High, but subsequent play deteriorates as agents become increasingly skeptical
that the previous generation played High. Once High play is sufficiently risky (γ is greater
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than γH), then even a small chance of facing a future exogenous Low player is enough so
that High is never played.
The picture following a prominent Low play is similar, but with different thresholds.
0 1
Last prominent was High
All High All LowStart High...
0 1
Last prominent was Low
All High All LowStart Low...
γH
γL
γH
γL
γ
γ
High is safe High is risky
Figure 2: A depiction of the play of endogenous players in the greatest equilibrium, as a
function of the underlying attractiveness of playing Low (γ), broken down as a function of
the play of the last prominent player.
In this subsection, we focus on conditions for High and Low social norms, in which
endogenous players follow the last prominent play regardless of their signals. The dynamics
of play in the intermediate regions, where endogenous agents respond to their signals, is
characterized in Section 4.4. Finally, in Section 4.5, we examine the role of endogenous
prominent agents and their ability to lead a society away from a Low social norm.
Recall from (3) that an endogenous player is willing to playHigh if and only if (1− λ)φtt−1+
λφtt+1 ≥ γ. Therefore, in order for High to be played by all endogenous players, it must
be that (3) holds for all possible signals when all other endogenous agents (are expected
to) play High and the last prominent agent played High. This is of course equivalent to
(3) holding conditional on the lowest possible signal (when all endogenous agents play High
and the last prominent agent played High) because this would ensure that High is a best
response for any signal, effectively locking it in following the High play of the last prominent
agent. The threshold for this to be case is
γ ≤ γ
H
≡ (1− λ) Φ(0, 1− pi) + λ (1− pi) . (4)
The expression is intuitive noting that Φ(0, 1−pi) is the probability of last generation having
played High conditional on the lowest possible signal, s = 0, and 1− pi is the probability of
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the next generation playing High (since only agents endogenously committed to Low will do
otherwise). We will see that above this threshold, endogenous agents immediately following
High prominent play will play High, because they are (fairly) confident that the last player
played High, but this confidence will gradually erode over time, and the likelihood of Low
play will increase (see Section 4.4).
Equivalently, rearranging (4), High will lock in following a prominent High if and only
if
λ ≥ γ − Φ(0, 1− pi)
1− pi − Φ(0, 1− pi) .
This way of expressing the conditions for a High social norm is also intuitive. Recalling that
λ is the weight that an agent places on the payoff from the interaction with the younger
generation, it implies that if a society is sufficiently forward looking, then it is possible
to sustain all High following a prominent High. Above this threshold, expectations that
future generations will play High is sufficient to keep a player playing High, even under the
lowest possible signal from the previous generation. In contrast, if agents are more backward
looking than implied by this threshold, then their play is eventually molded by history (and
the particular signals that they observe from the older generation).
Another key threshold is reached when High play becomes sufficiently risky that regard-
less of signal, the possibility of facing future Low is so overwhelmingly costly that all Low
becomes the only possible play. That threshold is described by γ = γH .
17 The character-
ization of greatest equilibrium play following a prominent High is then pictured in Figure
3. The shape in this figure follows since when λ = 1, agents only care about the next gen-
eration and so either players can sustain all High or all Low — making history completely
irrelevant. When λ = 0, agents are entirely backward looking and so after a prominent play
at least the first endogenous agent will play High, so that γH = 1.
There are analogous thresholds that apply after a prominent Low. Following a similar
logic to that above, all endogenous players indefinitely playing High following a prominent
Low is possible if and only if
γ ≤ γ
L
≡ λ (1− pi) , (5)
since this requires that they prefer to play High even following a Low prominently, and it
is entirely leveraged by their expectations of future play. This threshold can be expressed
17This threshold does not have a closed-form solution, though it is a well-defined monotone function of
parameters, including λ (see Appendix A). An upper bound on this threshold is provided by the most
optimistic belief an agent following a High prominent play could have: γH ≤ (1−λ) +λ(1−pi), and this is
the exact threshold in the extreme cases of λ = 0, 1, but not necessarily in between. For intermediate values
of λ, some future agents might not play High even with a very high signal from the first period agent who
plays High (depending on her expectations about the future).
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Figure 3: Play of endogenous players in the greatest equilibrium, as a function of how forward
looking they are (λ) and how risky High play is (γ), given that the last prominent player
played High.
again in terms of λ, λ ≥ γ/ (1− pi), and requires agents to be sufficiently forward looking —
caring more about their match with the younger generation. It can also be noted that when
(5) is satisfied so is (4), and a High social norm can be sustained regardless of the actions
of prominent agents.
The more interesting threshold is γ = γL. Below this threshold, a Low prominent play
is followed by all endogenous agents choosing Low regardless of their signal. Although, as
is also the case for γH , there is no general closed-form solution for γL, there is one when
γ
H
≥ γL. In this case (see Appendix A),
γL = γ
∗
L ≡ (1− λ) Φ(1, pi) + λ (1− pi) , (6)
which is conveniently symmetric to γ
H
: Low will play prominent Low regardless of signal
if γ is greater than a λ-weighted average of 1 − pi (probability of Low play for the next
generation) and Φ(1, pi) (the expectation of Low play in the previous generation given the
highest possible signal, s = 1).
This structure of equilibrium following Low prominent play is pictured in Figure 4, and
the full characterization of the greatest equilibrium is provided in Proposition 2.
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Figure 4: Play of endogenous players in the greatest equilibrium, as a function of how forward
looking they are (λ) and how risky High play is (γ), given that the last prominent player
played Low.
Proposition 2 In the greatest equilibrium:
• If the last prominent play was High then:
– If γ ≤ γ
H
, then all endogenous agents play High;
– if γ
H
< γ < γH , then endogenous agents start playing High following prominent
High, but then play Low for some signals; and
– if γH < γ, then all endogenous agents play Low.
• If the last prominent play was Low then:
– If γ ≤ γ
L
, then all endogenous agents play High,
– if γ
H
< γ < γL, then endogenous agents start playing Low following prominent
Low, but then play High for some signals; and
– if γL < γ, then all endogenous agents play Low.
Proposition 2 makes the role of history clear: for parameter values such that all High
is not an equilibrium, the social norm is determined by history for at least some time. In
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particular, if prominent agents are rare, then society follows a social norm established by
the last prominent agent for an extended period of time.
Nevertheless, our model also implies that social norms are not everlasting: switches in
social norms take place following the arrival of exogenous prominent agents (committed to
the opposite action). Thus when q is small, a particular social norm, determined by the
play of the last prominent agent, emerges and persists for a long time, disturbed only by
the emergence of another (exogenous) prominent agent who chooses the opposite action and
initiates a different social norm.
Some key comparative statics are also clear from this proposition (more detailed com-
parative statics are given in Appendix B). First, Figures 3 and 4 make it clear that as λ
increases — so that individuals care more about the future — all High following both High
and Low prominent play is an equilibrium for a larger set of values of other parameters
(e.g., more values of γ), and all Low is an equilibrium for a smaller set of values of other
parameters. This is intuitive: when agents are more forward-looking, coordinating on High
becomes easier (for the same reason that all High became the unique pure-strategy equi-
librium and the complete information version of the model). The impact of an increase in
the probability of exogenous agents, pi, is to reduce γH since it increases the probability of
exogenous Low players and thus the likelihood that an agent may want to switch to Low
following a low signal. However, the corresponding impact on γ
L
is ambiguous, since it
increases the presence of both High and Low exogenous players.18 Finally, as information
becomes more precise so that Φ(0, 1−pi) decreases (i.e., the 0 signal indicates Low play with
a higher probability), all High is more difficult to sustain. This is because as agents receive
more accurate information about the play of the previous generations, it becomes harder to
convince them to play High following a signal indicating an exogenous Low play.
It is also useful to compare behavior across the two possibilities for the last prominent
play. First clearly γ
H
≥ γ
L
, so that it is easier to sustain all High play following a prominent
High, and similarly γH ≥ γL, so that there are more situations where all Low is the only
possible continuation following a prominent Low than a prominent High. More interestingly,
we may also have γL < γH , so that the prominent agents lock in subsequent behavior —
a strong form of history dependence. Provided that λ < 1, the condition that γ
H
≥ γL
(which is equivalent to γ∗L < γH with γ
∗
L given by (6)) can be simply written as Φ(0, 1−pi) >
18In particular, this depends how accurate signals about past play are because an equilibrium with all
Low crucially depends on the inference about past play.
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Φ(1, pi).19 Defining the least and greatest likelihood ratios as
m ≡ fH (0)
fL (0)
< 1 and M ≡ fH (1)
fL (1)
> 1,
the (necessary and sufficient) condition for γL < γH is λ < 1 and
(1− pi)2
pi2
>
M
m
. (7)
This requires that m is not too small relative to M , so that signals are sufficiently noisy. Intu-
itively, when the greatest equilibrium involves all endogenous agents playing Low, this must
be the unique ‘continuation equilibrium’ (given the play of the last prominent agent). Thus
the condition that γ > γL ensures the uniqueness of the continuation equilibrium following
a prominent agent playing Low — otherwise all Low could not be the greatest equilibrium.
In this light, it is intuitive that this condition should require signals to be sufficiently noisy.
Otherwise, players would react strongly to signals from the previous generation and could
change to High behavior when they receive a strong signal indicating High play in the
previous generation and also expecting the next generation to receive accurate information
regarding their own behavior. Noisy signals ensure that each agent has a limited ability
to influence the future path of actions and thus prevent multiple equilibria supported by
coordinating on relatively precise signals of past actions.
4.4 The Reversion of Play over Time
We now complete the characterization of the greatest equilibrium for the cases where γ
H
<
γ ≤ γH and γL < γ ≤ γL, which involve the reversion of the play of regular players.
For example, when all High is not an equilibrium, then High play deteriorates following
a prominent play of High. This is a consequence of a more general monotonicity result
that shows that cutoffs always move in the same direction: that is, either thresholds are
monotonically non-increasing or monotonically non-decreasing, so that High play either
becomes monotonically more likely (if the last prominent play was Low) or monotonically
less likely (if the last prominent play was High). So for instance, when greatest equilibrium
behavior is not completely High, then High play deteriorates over time, meaning that as
the distance from the last prominent High agent increases, the likelihood of High behavior
decreases and corresponding cutoffs increase.
Since we are focusing on semi-Markovian equilibria, we denote, with a slight abuse of
notation, the cutoffs used by prominent and non-prominent agents τ periods after the last
19Recall that if γL ≤ γH , then γL = γ∗L as defined in (6). Therefore, γL < γH is equivalent to γ∗L < γH .
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prominent agent by cPτ and c
N
τ respectively. We say that High play is non-increasing over
time if (cPτ , c
N
τ ) ≤ (cPτ+1, cNτ+1) for each τ . We say that High play is decreasing over time,
if, in addition, whenever (cPτ , c
N
τ ) 6= (0, 0) and (cPτ , cNτ ) 6= (1, 1) it follows that (cPτ , cNτ ) 6=
(cPτ+1, c
N
τ+1). The concepts of Low play being non-decreasing and increasing over time are
defined analogously.
The definition of decreasing or increasing play implies that when the cutoffs for endoge-
nous agents are non-degenerate, they must strictly increase over time. This implies that,
unless High play completely dominates, High play strictly decreases over time.
Proposition 3 1. In the greatest equilibrium, cutoff sequences
(
cPτ , c
N
τ
)
are monotone:
following a prominent agent choosing High,
(
cPτ , c
N
τ
)
are non-decreasing and following
a prominent agent choosing Low, they are non-increasing.
2. If γ
H
< γ < γH , then in the greatest equilibrium, High play is decreasing over time
following High play by a prominent agent.
3. If γ
L
< γ < γL, then in the greatest equilibrium, High play is increasing over time
following Low play by a prominent agent.
Figure 5 illustrates the behavior of the cutoffs and the corresponding probabilities of
High play for regular agents following a High prominent play. For the reasons explained in
the paragraph preceding Proposition 3, prominent endogenous agents will have lower cutoffs
and higher probabilities of High play than regular agents. Depending on the specific levels
of parameters, it could be that prominent endogenous agents all play High for all signals
and times, or it could be that their play reverts too.
The intuition for Proposition 3 is interesting. Immediately following a High prominent
action, an agent knows for sure that she is facing High in the previous generation. Two
periods after a High prominent action, she is playing against an agent from the older gener-
ation who knew for sure that he himself was facing High in the previous generation. Thus
her opponent was likely to have chosen High himself. Nevertheless, since γ > γ
H
, there
are some signals for which she will be sufficiently confident that the previous generation
was of exogenous type and chose Low instead. Now consider an agent three periods after a
High prominent action. For this agent, not only is there the possibility that one of the two
previous agents were exogenous and committed to Low play, but also the possibility that his
immediate predecessor received an adverse signal and decided to play Low instead. Thus
he is even more likely to interpret adverse signals as coming from Low play than was his
predecessor. This reasoning highlights the tendency towards higher cutoffs and less High
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Figure 5: Reversion of play from High to the greatest steady state.
play over time. In fact, there is another more subtle force pushing in the same direction.
Since γ > γ
H
, each agent also realizes that even when she chooses High, the agent in the
next generation may receive an adverse signal, and the farther this agent is from the initial
prominent agent, the more likely are the signals resulting from her choice of High to be
interpreted as coming from a Low agent. This anticipation of how her signal will be inter-
preted — and thus become more likely to be countered by a play of Low – as the distance
to the prominent agent increases creates an additional force towards reversion.
The converse of this intuition explains why there is improvement of High play over
time starting with a prominent agent choosing Low. The likelihood of a given individual
encountering High play in the previous generation increases as the distance to prominent
agent increases as Figure 5 shows.
Proposition 3 also implies that behavior converges to a limiting (steady-state) distribu-
tion along sample paths where there are no prominent agents. Two important caveats need
to be noted, however. First, this limiting distribution depends on the starting point. More-
over, the limiting distribution following a prominent agent playing Low may be different
from the limiting distribution following a prominent agent playing High. This can be seen
by considering the case where γL < γ < γH , already discussed above: here the (trivial)
limiting distribution is a function of the action of the last prominent agent which completely
locks in play until the next prominent agent. Second, while there is convergence to a limiting
distribution along sample paths without prominent agents, there is in general no convergence
to a stationary distribution because of the arrival of exogenous prominent agents. In partic-
ular, provided that q > 0 (and since pi > 0), the society will necessarily fluctuate between
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different patterns of behavior. For example, when γL < γ < γH , as already pointed out
following Proposition 2, the society will fluctuate between social norms of High and Low
play as exogenous prominent agents arrive and choose different actions (even if this happens
quite rarely).
Note also that there is an interesting difference between the ways in which reversion
occurs in Proposition 3 starting from Low versus High play. Endogenous prominent agents
are always at least weakly as willing to play High as are regular agents, since they will be
observed and are thus more likely to have their High play reciprocated by the next agent.
Thus, their cutoffs are always weakly lower and their corresponding probability of playing
High is higher. Hence, if play starts at High, then it is the regular agents who are reverting
more, i.e., playing Low with a greater probability. In contrast, if play starts at Low, then it
is the prominent agents who revert more, i.e., playing High with a greater probability (and
eventually leading to a new prominent history beginning with a High play). It is possible,
for some parameter values, that one type of endogenous player sticks with the play of the
last prominent agent (prominent endogenous when starting with High, and non-prominent
endogenous when starting with Low), while the other type of endogenous player strictly
reverts in play.20
4.5 Breaking the Low Social Norm
In this subsection, we illustrate how prominent agents can exploit their greater (and common
knowledge) visibility to future generations in order to play a leadership role and break the
Low social norm to induce a switch to High play. Consider a Low social norm where all
regular agents play Low.21 Suppose that at generation t there is an endogenous prominent
agent. The key question analyzed in the next proposition is when an endogenous prominent
agent would like to switch to High play in order to change the existing social norm.
Let γ˜L denote the threshold such that above this level, in the greatest equilibrium, all
regular (endogenous but non-prominent) players choose Low following a prominent Low.
It is straightforward to see that 0 < γ˜L < γL (provided λ < 1), and so this is below
the threshold where all endogenous players choose Low (because, as we explained above,
prominent endogenous agents are more willing to switch to High than regular agents).
20The asymmetry between reversion starting from Low versus High play we are emphasizing here is
distinct from the asymmetry that results from our focus on the greatest equilibrium. In particular, this
asymmetry is present even if we focus on the least equilibrium.
21The social norm in question here involves one in which all regular agents, but not necessarily endogenous
prominent agents, play Low.
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Proposition 4 Consider the greatest equilibrium:
1. Suppose that γ˜L ≤ γ < min{γ∗L, γH} and that the last prominent agent has played Low.
Then there exists a cutoff c˜ < 1 such that an endogenous prominent agent playing at
least two periods after the last prominent agent and receiving a signal s > c˜ will choose
High and break the Low social norm.
2. Suppose that γ < min{γ˜L, γH} and that the last prominent agent played Low. Then
there exists a sequence of decreasing cutoffs {c˜τ}∞τ=2 < 1 such that an endogenous
prominent agent playing τ ≥ 2 periods after the last prominent agent and receiving
a signal s > c˜τ will choose High and switch to play from the path of convergence to
steady state to a High social norm.
The proposition and subsequent results are proven in Appendix B.
The results in this proposition are important and intuitive. Their importance stems from
the fact that they show how prominent agents can play a crucial leadership role in society.
In particular, the first part shows that starting with the Low social norm, a prominent agent
who receives a signal from the last generation that is not too adverse (so that there is some
positive probability that she is playing an exogenous type committed to High play) will find
it profitable to choose High, and this will switch the entire future path of play, creating a
High social norm instead. The second part shows that prominent agents can also play a
similar role starting from a situation which does not involve a strict Low social norm —
instead, starting with Low and reverting to a steady-state distribution. In this case, the
threshold for instigating such a switch depends on how far they are from the last prominent
agent who has chosen Low.
The intuition for these results is also interesting as it clarifies how history and expectations
shape the evolution of cooperation. Prominent agents can play a leadership role because they
can exploit their impact on future expectations and their visibility by future generations in
order to change a Low social norm into a High one. In particular, when the society is stuck
in a Low social norm, regular agents do not wish to deviate from this, because they know
that the previous generation has likely chosen Low and also that even if they were to choose
High, the signal generated by their action would likely be interpreted by the next generation
as coming from a Low action. For a prominent agent, the latter is not a concern, since her
action is perfectly observed by the next generation. Moreover and perhaps more importantly
from an economic point of view, her deviation from the Low social norm can influence the
expectations of all future generations, reinforcing the incentives of the next generation to
also switch their action to High.
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5 Discussion and Extensions
In this section, we first clarify the role of prominence in coordinating expectations and
enabling endogenous leadership. We then outline how our results extend to the case in
which there are n > 1 agents within each generation. We also show how our analysis applies
with different structures of payoffs, how imperfect prominence affects our results, and how
the framework can be generalized to endogenize prominence.
5.1 Prominence, Expectations and Leadership
In this subsection we highlight the role of prominence in our model, emphasizing that promi-
nence is different from (stronger than) simply being observed by the next generation with
certainty. In particular, the fact that prominence involves being observed by all subsequent
generations with certainty plays a central role in our results. To clarify this, we consider
four scenarios.
In each scenario, for simplicity, we assume that there is a starting non-prominent agent
at time 0 who plays High with probability x0 ∈ (0, 1), where x0 is known to all agents who
follow, and generates a signal for the first agent in the usual way. All agents after time 1
are not prominent. In every case all agents (including time 1 agents) are endogenous with
probability (1− 2pi) as before.
Scenario 1. The agent at time 1 is not prominent and his or her action is observed with the usual
signal structure.
Scenario 2. The agent at time 1’s action is observed perfectly by the period 2 agent, but not by
future agents.
Scenario 2′. The agent at time 1 is only observed by the next agent according to a signal, but then
is subsequently perfectly observed by all agents who follow from time 3 onwards.
Scenario 3. The agent at time 1 is prominent, and all later agents are viewed with the usual signal
structure.
Clearly, as we move from Scenario 1 to Scenario 2 (or 2′) to Scenario 3, we are moving
from a non-prominent agent to a prominent one, with Scenarios 2 and 2′ being hybrids,
where the agent of generation t = 1 has greater visibility than a non-prominent agent but is
not fully prominent in terms of being observed forever after.
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We focus again on the greatest equilibrium and let ck(λ, γ, fH , fL, pi) denote the cutoff
signal above which the first agent (if endogenous) plays High under scenario k as a function
of the underlying setting.
Proposition 5 The cutoffs satisfy c2(·) ≥ c3(·) and c1(·) ≥ c2′(·) ≥ c3(·), and there are
settings (λ, γ, fH , fL, pi) for which the inequalities are strict.
The intuition for this result is instructive. First, comparing Scenario 2 to Scenario 3, the
former has the same observability of the action by the next generation (the only remaining
generation that directly cares about the action of the agent) but not the common knowledge
that future generations will also observe this action. This means that future generations will
not necessarily coordinate on the basis of a choice of High by this agent, and this discourages
High play by the agent at date t = 2, and through this channel, it also discourages High
play by the agent at date t = 1, relative to the case in which there was full prominence.
The comparison of Scenario 2′ to Scenario 1 is perhaps more surprising. In Scenario 2′, the
agent at date t = 1 knows that her action will be seen by future agents, so if she plays High,
then this gives agent 3 extra information about the signals that agent 2 is likely to observe.
This creates strong feedback effects in turn affecting agent 1. In particular, agent 3 would
choose a lower cutoff for a given cutoff of agent 2 when she sees High play by agent 1. But
knowing that agent 3 is using a lower cutoff, agent 2 will also find it beneficial to use a lower
cutoff. This not only feeds back to agent 3, making her even more aggressive in playing
High, but also encourages agent 1 to play High as she knows that agent 2 is more likely
to respond with High himself. In fact, these feedback effects continue and affect all future
agents in the same manner, and in turn, the expectation that they will play High with a
higher probability further encourages High play by agents 1 and 2. Thus, one can leverage
things upwards even through delayed prominence.
Notably, a straightforward extension of the proof of Proposition 5 shows that the same
comparisons hold if we replace “time 3” in Scenarios 2 or 2′ with “time k” for any k ≥ 3.22
22There are two omitted comparisons: between scenarios 2 and 2′ and between scenarios 1 and 2. Both
of these are ambiguous. It is clear why the comparison between scenarios 2 and 2′ is ambiguous as those
information structures are not nested. The ambiguity between scenarios 1 and 2 is more subtle, as one might
have expected that c1 ≥ c2. The reason why this is not always the case is interesting. When signals are
sufficiently noisy and x0 is sufficiently close to 1, under scenario 1 agent 2 would prefer to choose High
regardless of the signal she receives. This would in turn induce agent 1 to choose High for most signals.
When the agent 2 instead observes agent 1’s action perfectly as in scenario 2, then (provided that λ is not
too high) she will prefer to match this action, i.e., play High only when agent 1 plays High. The expectation
that she will play Low in response to Low under scenario 2 then leads agents born in periods 3 and later to
be more pessimistic about the likelihood of facing High and they will thus play Low with greater probability
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5.2 Multiple Agents within Generations
We now return to a variation on the model of collective action outlined in Section 2 (now
without the neighborhood structure) to show how our results extend to an environment with
multiple agents within each generation. For simplicity, we work directly with the same payoff
matrix and notation as for the main results above, with the changes as indicated below.
There are n agents within each generation, and each interacts with all agents from the
previous generation and from the next generation.23 The expected utility of agent i from
generation t is then
(1− λ)
n∑
j=1
u(Ai,t, Aj,t−1) + λ
n∑
j=1
u(Ai,t, Aj,t+1).
There is at most one prominent agent within a generation. If there is such a prominent
agent, then her action is also taken by m − 1 other (randomly-chosen) agents of the same
generation. Thus, a prominent agent is able to coordinate the actions of m−1 agents within
their generation.
The information structure is as follows. If there is a prominent agent in generation t− 1
then each agent of generation t observes the action of the prominent agent and nothing else
about that generation. Moreover, prominent agents’ behaviors are observed forever. If there
is no prominent agent in generation t − 1, agent i of generation t observes a signal si,t−1
generated from a randomly selected agent from the previous generation.
Any agent is exogenous with a probability 2pi as before (except if some other agent
is prominent within their generation, in which case their action may be directed by that
prominent agent).
First consider the case in which m = n, so that a prominent agent is able to coordinate
the actions of all other agents within her generation (which are thus all identical to her
action). Then the results presented for the baseline model extend as follows.
The thresholds characterizing the structure of greatest/least equilibria extend from Propo-
sition 2. To economize on space, we only discuss a couple of these thresholds and then move
on the the case in which m < n.
than they would do under scenario 1. This then naturally feeds back and affects the tradeoff facing agent 2
and she may even prefer to play Low following High play; in response the agent born in period 1 may also
choose Low. All of this ceases to be an issue if the play of the agent born at date 1 is observed by all future
generations (as in scenarios 2′ and 3), since in this case the ambiguity about agent 2’s play disappears.
23We could also allow the agents to interact within their own generation. This would require a third
weight (in addition to λ and 1 − λ) and also introduces an extra layer of coordinations among the current
generation. Nonetheless, there still exist greatest and least equilibria, and our main results are similar. For
parsimony, we stick with the simpler model.
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Conditional upon seeing a signal s and given a prior belief that the probability that
regular agents of the previous generation play High is x, the expected fraction of agents
from the previous generation who play High is
Φn (s, x) =
1
n
Φ(s, x) +
n− 1
n
x. (8)
The threshold γn
H
for High to be a best response when all future regular agents are
expected to play High (independently of the last prominent play) is again γ ≤ (1 −
λ)Φn (0, 1− pi) + λ(1− pi), by the same reasoning as before. Thus,
γn
H
≡ (1− λ)
[
1
n
Φ(0, 1− pi) + n− 1
n
(1− pi)
]
+ λ (1− pi) . (9)
This expression takes into account that signals are less informative about behavior. Clearly,
γn
H
is increasing in n, which implies that the set of parameters under which High play will
follow High prominent play is greater when there are more players within each generation.
This is because the signal each one receives becomes less informative about the overall actions
that a player faces, and thus they put less weight on the signal and more weight on the action
of the last prominent agent.
This reasoning enables us to directly generalize the results of Proposition 2 and also
determine how these thresholds vary with n (see Proposition 6).
What happens if m < n? In this case, the analysis is more complicated, but similar results
apply. In particular, a sufficient threshold for all endogenous agents to play High following
a prominent High from the previous generation is given by the following reasoning. The
worst posterior that an agent can have after a prominent High in the previous generation
would be given by assuming that the history is such that all n−m agents who have not been
coordinated by the prominent agent are playing Low, which would be m/n. Therefore, we
can write
γn,m
H
≡ min
{
(1− λ) m
n
+ λ (1− pi) , γn
H
}
(10)
The intuition is clear. γ ≤ γn,m
H
is sufficient to ensure that all endogenous agents in the first
generation following a prominent High play will also choose High if they expect the next
generation to all play High, which is then guaranteed since γ ≤ γn
H
. A similar argument
extends to the threshold γn,mL . This enables us to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 6 Consider the model with n agents within each generation outlined in this
subsection.
1. Suppose that m = n. Then, following a prominent play of Low, in the greatest equi-
librium there is a Low social norm and all endogenous agents play Low if and only
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if γnL < γ. Following a prominent play of High, there is a High social norm and all
endogenous agents play High if and only if γ ≤ γn
H
. Moreover, the threshold γn
H
is in-
creasing in n. If, in addition, γn
H
≥ γnL (which is satisfied when (7) holds), the threshold
γnL is also nonincreasing in n, so that both High and Low social norms following, re-
spectively, High and Low prominent play, emerge for a larger set of parameter values.
The same result also holds (i.e., the threshold γnL is nonincreasing in n) when q = 0 so
that there are no prominent agents after the initial period.
2. Suppose that m < n. Then, in the greatest equilibrium following a prominent play of
Low, there is a Low social norm and all endogenous agents play Low if γn,mL < γ.
Following a prominent play of High, there is a High social norm and all endogenous
agents play High if γ ≤ γn,m
H
.
This proposition covers two of the thresholds, but leaves out the other two γn
L
and γnH
(or γn,m
L
and γn,mH ), which are defined as the equivalents of γL and γH in the baseline model.
As before, these thresholds depend on beliefs and do not have direct closed-form solutions.
A complication here is that for an agent’s prediction of what agents of the future generation
will do involves interpreting past signals. The signal that an agent sees from the previous
generation is a noisy indicator about what those in her own generation have seen, which then
translates into an indicator of what other agents in the next generation are likely see. The
extreme cases where λ is 0 or 1 decouple this relationship, but more generally equilibrium
cutoffs can depend on the these expectations.
Results about breaking the Low social norm can also be extended to this model. With a
similar analysis, an endogenous prominent agent can choose High to change the social norm
of the society, and in addition to the factors making such a choice more attractive in our
baseline model, it will also be more attractive when m is greater.
Another observation is noteworthy. In this model, even if a player has information about
the previous generation containing a prominent agent, but not about what action this agent
took, this could still lead to a switch from a Low to High social norm in the greatest
equilibrium. The reasoning is as follows: players of this generation can believe that an
endogenous prominent agent will choose High with a high probability, and thus are more
likely to respond with High. If so, it makes sense for endogenous prominent agent to choose
High to coordinate with the next generation, making these beliefs self-fulfilling.
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5.3 More General Payoff Structures
Our analysis can be extended straightforwardly to more general payoff structures. For this
discussion and for the rest of this section, let us return to the model with a single agent
per generation. First, consider the following general symmetric two-by-two game, where we
retain the same labels on strategies for convenience:
High Low
High b11, b11 b12, b12
Low b21, b21 b22, b22
Since the subtraction of the payoff vector for one action from the other (for a given player)
generates a new payoff matrix that is strategically equivalent (i.e., leaves the set of best
responses to any strategy profile unchanged), it follows that the current payoff matrix is
equivalent to our baseline with:24
α = b22 − b12 > 0 and β = b11 − b21 > 0,
provided that these inequalities are indeed satisfied. Therefore, all of our results so far
identically generalize to this case.
The above generalization does not cover other interesting cases, for example, prisoner
dilemma-type payoffs. Nevertheless, our general analysis also applies to such cases. For
such cases it is the fact that the next generation will observe a signal of current actions that
creates incentives for cooperation (even among regular players). This highlights the role
of forward-looking behavior even more clearly. Suppose, more specifically, that the payoff
matrix is
High Low
High β, β −α, κ
Low κ,−α 0, 0
where κ > β > 0 and α > 0.25 It can be verified that all Low is an equilibrium provided
that signals are sufficiently precise. More important, using the same reasoning as above, it
can also be seen that with sufficiently precise signals and λ sufficiently large, there is also
an equilibrium in which High is played in response to good signals from the past.26 This
is intuitive: with sufficiently precise signals, an agent will be fairly sure that the previous
24To obtain this, simply subtract the payoff vector for the action Low for one player, (b21, b22), from the
payoff vector for High, (b11, b12).
25This can also be written more generally for the class of strategically equivalent payoff matrices, but we
omit this step to simplify the discussion.
26There does not, however, exist an equilibrium in which High is played in response to all signals for
obvious reasons.
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generation has played High following a good realization of the signal, and can also expect
the next generation to receive a good signal. In this situation, deviating to Low would
generate a payoff gain from his interaction with the previous generation, but will make the
next generation switch to Low with sufficiently high probability, which is costly. This is
enough to deter Low when λ is sufficiently high. Note that beliefs about whether High is
being played with a high probability (e.g., as a function of past history of prominent agents)
will again have a defining effect on the interpretation of signals from the last generation and
thus on the willingness of an agent to go along with the prevailing social norms and play
High.
It is also straightforward to verify that when κ− β ≤ α, the resulting dynamic game of
incomplete information is one of strategic complements. This ensures that results similar to
those presented above apply in this case.
5.4 Imperfect Prominence
A natural question is whether our results on history-driven behavior hinge on perfect ob-
servation of prominent agents. To investigate this question, consider a variation where all
future generations observe the same imperfect signal concerning the action of past promi-
nent agents. In particular, suppose that they all receive a public signal rt ∈ {Low,High} (in
addition to the private signal st from the non-prominent agent in the previous generation)
concerning the action of the prominent agent of time t (if there is indeed a prominent agent
at time t). We assume that rt = at with probability η, where at ∈ {Low,High} is the action
of the prominent agent. Clearly, as η → 1, we converge to our baseline environment.
An important observation in this case is that the third part of Proposition 1 no longer
applies and the greatest and least equilibria are not necessarily semi-Markovian. This is
because, given imperfect signals about the actions of prominent agents, the play of previous
prominent agents is relevant for beliefs about the play of the last prominent agent. Neverthe-
less, when η is sufficiently large but still strictly less than 1, the greatest equilibrium is again
semi-Markovian and can be driven by history; i.e., the common signal generated by the ac-
tion of the last prominent agent.27 A similar analysis also leads to the conclusion that when
27In particular, it can be shown that following a signal of r = H, the probability that a prominent agent
has indeed played High cannot be lower than
η′ ≡ piη
piη + (1− pi) (1− η) .
This follows because there is always a probability pi that the prominent agent in question was exogenously
committed to High. For η close enough to 1, η′ is strictly greater than Φ (0, 1− pi). In that case, whenever
γ ≤ γ
H
, where γ
H
is given by (4), the reasoning that established Proposition 2 implies that, when the public
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η is sufficiently large, all endogenous agents playing Low following a prominent public signal
of Low is the greatest equilibrium whenever γ > γL, and our results on leadership-driven
changes in social norms also generalize to this setup. Notably, for these conclusions, η needs
to be greater than a certain threshold that is strictly less than 1, and thus history-driven
behavior emerges even with signals bounded away from being fully precise.
5.5 Endogenous Prominence
In practice certain agents, such as Nelson Mandela, George Washington or Mahatma Gandhi,
are prominent not exogenously, but because of the remarkable acts and self sacrifices (as
vividly described by the self immolation of Mohamed Bouazazi, who became prominent and
sparked the Arab Spring).
To capture these issues in the simplest possible way, we can extend our baseline model
as follows. With independent probability χ, an agent has the opportunity to incur a cost
of τ > 0 to become prominent (have his actions be seen by all future generations). This
modified game no longer exhibits strategic complementarities, because the expectation that
the next generation will invest in prominence can discourage prominence and thus delay
a potential switch to High this period. Nevertheless, there is still a greatest equilibrium
in semi-Markovian strategies, and the structure of this equilibrium is similar to our base-
line results. In particular, versions of Propositions 2 and 3 apply with slightly modified
thresholds.
When, in addition, with probability q > 0, each agent may be prominent directly by
chance, Proposition 4 becomes more interesting: now there are two threshold signals from
the past generation, above one of them a directly prominent agent breaks the social norm
of Low, and above the second (higher) one a regular agent with an opportunity to invest in
prominence will do so to break the social norm of Low.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the emergence and dynamic evolution of the social norm of “coop-
eration”. Social norms shape beliefs and behavior, but rather than being completely locked
in, they change over time in response to individual behavior and actions by prominent agents
or “leaders”.
signal from the last prominent agent indicates that she played High, the greatest equilibrium involves all
endogenous agents playing High (regardless of their signal).
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Our main contribution is to provide a tractable model to study the dynamics of social
norms and the role of leadership and prominence in shaping social norms. An important
aspect of our framework is that, rather than being shifts between multiple equilibria, changes
in social norms in our model change along a given equilibrium path. In fact, these norms
can be completely (uniquely) determined by history, but still change over time. Thus history
is more than a simple correlating device in our framework: behavior today can be uniquely
determined by distant history that is irrelevant to current payoffs. This is because past events
provide information about how other agents will interpret their information. In particular,
beginning from even a distant history of more cooperative play, current signals are more
favorably interpreted.
This setup underlies our interpretation of social norms as “frames of reference” that shape
how information from the past is interpreted because agents only receive noisy information
about past play. History — shared, common knowledge past events — anchors these social
norms. For example, if history indicates that there is a Low social norm (e.g., due to a Low
prominent play), then even moderately favorable signals of past actions will be interpreted
as being due to noise and agents would be unwilling to switch to High. A form of history-
driven social norm, potentially persisting for a long time, emerges as a result of this role of
social norms as frames of reference: Low behavior persists partly because, given the social
norm, the signals the agents would generate even with a High action would be interpreted
as if they were coming from a Low action, and this discourages High actions.
The impact of history is potentially countered by “prominent” agents, who create the
opportunity for future generations to coordinate. Then social norms are no longer necessarily
everlasting, because prominent agents exogenously committed to one or the other mode of
behavior may arrive and cause a switch in play — and thus in the resulting social norm.
More interestingly, prominent agents can also endogenously leverage their greater visibility
and play a leadership role by coordinating the expectations of future generations. In this
case, starting from a Low social norm, a prominent agent may choose to break the social
norm and induce a switch to a High social norm in society.
We also showed that in equilibria that are not completely driven by history, there is a
pattern of “reversion” whereby, for example, play starting with High reverts toward lower
cooperation. The reason for this is interesting: an agent immediately following a prominent
High knows that she is playing against a High action in the past. An agent two periods
after a prominent High, on the other hand, must take into account that there may have
been an exogenous non-prominent agent committed to Low in the previous period. Three
periods after a prominent High, the likelihood of an intervening exogenous non-prominent
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agent committed to Low is even higher. But more importantly, there are two additional
forces pushing towards reversion. First, these agents will anticipate that even endogenous
non-prominent agents now may start choosing Low because they are unsure of with whom
they are playing in the previous generation, and also because an adverse signal will make
them believe that they are playing an exogenous non-prominent agent committed to Low,
encouraging them to also do Low. Second, they will also understand that the signals that
their High action will generate may also be interpreted as if they were coming from a Low
action, further discouraging High.
There are several promising areas of future work based on our approach, and more gener-
ally based on the interplay between history, social norms and interpretation of past actions.
First, it would be useful to extend the analysis of the role of history, expectations and lead-
ership to a more detailed, and empirically-grounded, model of collective action, in which
individuals care about how many people, from the past and future generations, will take
part in some collective action, such as an uprising or demonstration against a regime.
Second, in some situations non-prominent agents in our model have an incentive to
communicate their behavior, since by doing so they can avoid the need to rely on social
norms for forming accurate expectations of past and future play. It is also possible that a
society might have asymmetric incentives to communicate history to future generations, for
instance perhaps erasing evidence of past prominent Low play and reporting past prominent
High play. This has interesting consequences, making observed (perceived) histories less
trustworthy. Another related direction is to study the evolution of social norms in situations
where incentives are not fully aligned, so that communication does not fully circumvent the
role of social norms in coordinating expectations.
Finally, it would be interesting to introduce an explicit network structure in the pattern of
observation and interaction so that agents who occupy a central position in the social network
— whose actions are thus known to be more likely to be observed by many others in the
future — (endogenously) play the role of prominent agents in our baseline model. This will
help us get closer to understanding which types of agents, and under which circumstances,
can play a leadership role.
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Appendix
Equilibrium Definition
Our definition of equilibrium is standard and requires that agents best respond to their
beliefs conditional on any history and signal and given the strategies of others.28 The only
thing that we need to be careful about is defining those beliefs. In cases where 0 < q < 1
and pi > 0 those beliefs are easily derived from Bayes’ rule (and an appropriate iterative
application of (2)). We provide a careful definition that also allows for q = 0 or pi = 0 even
though in the text we have assumed q > 0 and pi > 0. In these corner cases some additional
care is necessary since some histories off the equilibrium path may not be reached.29
Consider any t ≥ 1, any history ht−1, and a strategy profile σ.
Let φtt+1(σt+1, Tt, h
t−1) be the probability that, given strategy σt+1, the next agent will
play High if agent t plays High and is of prominence type Tt ∈ {P,N}. Note that this is
well-defined and is independent of the signal that agent t observes.
Let φtt−1(σ, st, h
t−1) denote the probability that agent t assigns to the previous agent
playing High given signal st, strategy profile σ, and history h
t−1. In particular: if ht−1 =
High then set φtt−1(σ, st, h
t−1) = 1 and if ht−1 = Low then set φ
t
t−1(σ, st, h
t−1) = 0. If
ht−1 = N then define φ
t
t−1(σ, st, h
t−1) via an iterative application Bayes’ rule. Specifically,
this is done via an application of (2) as follows. Let τ be the largest element of {1, . . . , t−1}
such that hτ 6= N (i.e., the date of the last prominent agent). Then given στ+1(hτ , N, sτ+1)
and pi, there is an induced distribution on High and Low by generation τ + 1 and thus over
sτ+2 (and note that sτ+1 is irrelevant since τ is prominent). Then given στ+2(h
τ , N, sτ+2)
and pi, there is an induced distribution on High and Low by generation τ + 2, and so forth.
By induction, there is an induced distribution on High and Low at time t − 1, which we
then denote by xt−1. Then φ
t
t−1(σ, st, h
t−1) = Φ(st, xt−1) where Φ is defined in (2).
From (3), it is a best response for agent t to play High if
(1− λ)φtt−1(σ, st, ht−1) + λφtt+1(σt+1, Tt, ht−1) > γ, (A1)
28Definitions for perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium are messy when working with
continua of private signals, and so it is easiest to provide a direct definition of equilibrium here which is
relatively straightforward.
29These beliefs can still be consequential. To see an example of why this matters in our context, consider
a case where all agents are endogenous and prominent (so pi = 0 and q = 1, which is effectively a complete
information game). Let an agent be indifferent between High and Low if both surrounding generations
play Low, but otherwise strictly prefer High. Begin with agent 0 playing Low. There is a (Bayesian) Nash
equilibrium where all agents play Low regardless of what others do, but it is not perfect (Bayesian). This
leads to different minimal equilibria depending on whether one works with Bayesian or perfect Bayesian
equilibrium.
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to play Low if
(1− λ)φtt−1(σ, st, ht−1) + λφtt+1(σt+1, Tt, ht−1) < γ, (A2)
and either if there is equality.
We say that σ forms an equilibrium if for each time t ≥ 1, history ht−1 ∈ Ht−1, signal
st ∈ [0, 1], and type Tt ∈ {P,N} σt(ht−1, st, Tt) = 1 if (A1) holds and σt(ht−1, st, Tt) = 0 if
(A2) holds, where φtt−1(σ, st, h
t−1) and φtt+1(σt+1, Tt, h
t−1) are as defined above.
Equilibria in Games with Strategic Complementarities and Infinitely
Many Agents
We now establish a theorem that will be used in proving Proposition 1. This theorem is
also of potential independent interest for this class of overlapping-generation incomplete
information games.
Well-known results for games of strategic complements apply to finite numbers of agents
(e.g., see Topkis (1979), Vives (1990), Milgrom and Shannon (1994), Zhou (1994), and van
Zandt and Vives (2007)). The next theorem provides an extension for arbitrary sets of
agents, including countably and uncountably infinite sets of agents.
Let us say that a game is a game of weak strategic complements with a possibly infinite
number of agents if the agents are indexed by i ∈ I and:
• each agent has an action space Ai that is a complete lattice with a partial ordering ≥i
and corresponding supi and infi;
• for every agent i, and specification of strategies of the other agents, a−i ∈ Πj 6=i,j∈IAj,
agent i has a nonempty set of best responses BRi(a−i) that is a closed sublattice of
Ai (where “closed” here is in the lattice-sense, so that sup(BRi(a−i)) ∈ BRi(a−i) and
inf(BRi(a−i)) ∈ BRi(a−i));
• for every agent i, if a′j ≥j aj for all j 6= i, j ∈ I, then supiBRi(a′−i) ≥i supiBRi(a−i)
and infiBRi(a
′
−i) ≥i infiBRi(a−i).
For the next theorem, define a ≥ a′ if and only if ai ≥i a′i for all i. The lattice of equilibria
on A = ΠAi∈I can then be defined with respect to this partial ordering.30
30Note, however, that the set of equilibria is not necessarily a sublattice of A, as pointed out in Topkis
(1979) and in Zhou (1994) for the finite case. That is, the sup in A of a set of equilibria may not be an
equilibrium, and so sup and inf have to be appropriately defined over the set of equilibria to ensure that the
set is a complete lattice. Nevertheless, the same partial ordering can be used to define the greatest and least
equilibria.
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Theorem 1 Consider a game of weak strategic complements with a possibly infinite number
of agents. A pure strategy equilibrium exists, and the set of pure strategy equilibria form a
complete lattice.
Proof of Theorem 1: Let A = Πi∈IAi. Note that A is a complete lattice, where we say
that a ≥ a′ if and only if ai ≥ a′i for every i ∈ I, and where for any S ⊂ A we define
sup(S) = (sup
i
{ai : a ∈ S})i∈I , and
inf(S) = (inf
i
{ai : a ∈ S})i∈I .
Given the lattice A, we define the best response correspondence f : A→ 2A by
f(a) = (BRi{a−i})i∈I
By the definition of a game of strategic complements, BRi(a−i) is a nonempty closed sublat-
tice of Ai for each i and a−i, and so it follows directly that f(a) is a nonempty closed sublattice
of A for every a ∈ A. Note that by the strategic complementarities f is monotone: if a ≥ a′
then sup(f(a)) ≥ sup(f(a′)) and inf(f(a)) ≥ inf(f(a′)). This follows directly from the fact
that if a′−i ≥ a−i, then supBRi(a′−i) ≥i supBRi(a−i) (and inf BRi(a′−i) ≥i inf BRi(a−i)) for
each i.
Thus, by an extension of Tarski’s (1955) fixed point theorem due to Straccia, Ojeda-
Aciego, and Damasio (2009) (see also Zhou (1994)),31 f has a fixed point and its fixed points
form a complete lattice (with respect to ≥). Note that a fixed point of f is necessarily a
best response to itself, and so is a pure strategy equilibrium, and all pure strategy equilibria
are fixed points of f , and so the pure strategy equilibria are exactly the fixed points of f .
Proofs of Propositions 1-3
Proof of Proposition 1:
Part 1: The result follows by showing that for any strategy profile there exists a best
response that is in cutoff strategies. To see this, recall from (3) that High is a best response
if and only if
(1− λ)φtt−1 + λφtt+1 ≥ γ, (A3)
and is a unique best response if the inequality is strict. Clearly, φtt−1(σ, s, h
t−1) (as defined
in our definition of equilibrium) is increasing in s under the MLRP (and given that pi > 0)
31The monotonicity of f here implies the EM -monotonicity in Proposition 3.15 of Straccia, Ojeda-Aciego,
and Damasio (2009).
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in any period not following a prominent agent. Moreover, φtt+1 is independent of the signal
received by the agent of generation t. Thus, if an agent follows a non-prominent agent,
the best responses are in cutoff strategies and are unique except for a signal that leads to
exact indifference, i.e., (A3) holding exactly as equality, in which case any mixture is a best
response. An agent following a prominent agent does not receive a signal s about playing the
previous generation, so φtt−1(σ, s, h
t−1) is either 0 or 1, and thus trivially in cutoff strategies.
This completes the proof of Part 1.
Also, for future reference, we note that in both cases the set of best responses are closed
(either 0 or 1, or any mixture thereof).
Part 2: The result that there exists a semi-Markovian equilibrium in cutoff strategies
follows from the proof of Part 3, where we show that the set of equilibria in cutoff strategies
and semi-Markovian equilibria in cutoff strategies are non-empty and complete lattices.
Part 3: This part of the proof will use Theorem 1 (see Appendix B) applied to cutoff and
semi-Markovian cutoff strategies to show that the sets of these equilibria are nonempty and
complete lattices. We will then show that greatest and least equilibria are semi-Markovian.
We thus first need to show that our game is one of weak strategic complements. We start
with the following intermediate result.
Claim 1 The set of cutoff and semi-Markovian cutoff strategies for a given player are com-
plete lattices.
Proof. The cutoff strategies of a player of generation t can be written as a vector in [0, 1]3
t
,
where this vector specifies a cutoff for every possible history of prominent agents (and there
are 3t of them, including time t = 0). This is a complete lattice with the usual Euclidean
partial order. Semi-Markovian cutoff strategies, on the other hand, can be simply written
as a single cutoff (depending on the player’s prominence type and the number of periods τ
since the last prominent agent).
Next, we verify the strategic complementarities for cutoff strategies. Let zt−1(σ, ht−1)
be the prior probability that this agent assigns to an agent of the previous period play-
ing High conditional on ht−1 (and before observing s). Fix a cutoff strategy profile c =(
cN1 (h
0) , cP1 (h
0) , ...cNt (h
t−1) , cPt (h
t−1) , ...
)
. Suppose that supBRTt (c) is the greatest best
response of agent of generation t of prominence type T to the cutoff strategy profile c (mean-
ing that it is the best response with the lowest cutoffs). Now consider:
c˜ = (c˜N1 (h
0) , c˜P1 (h
0) ,..., c˜Nt (h
t−1) , c˜Pt (h
t−1) , ...) ≤ c = (cN1 (h0) , cP1 (h0) ,..., cNt (ht−1) , cPt (ht−1) , ...).
We will show that supBRTt (c) ≥ supBRTt (c˜) (the argument for inf BRTt (c) ≥ inf BRTt (c˜) is
analogous). First, cutoffs after t+ 2 do not affect BRTt (c). Second, suppose that all cutoffs
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before t− 1 remain fixed and cNt+1 and cPt+1 decrease (meaning that they are weakly lower for
every history and at least one of them is strictly lower for at least one history). This increases
φtt+1(σ, T, h
t−1) and thus makes (A3) more likely to hold, so supBRTt (c) ≥ supBRTt (c˜).
Third, suppose that all cutoffs before t − 2 remain fixed, and cNt−1 and cPt−1 decrease. This
increases zt−1(σ, ht−1) and thus φ
t
t−1(σ, s, h
t−1) and thus makes (A3) more likely to hold,
so again supBRTt (c) ≥ supBRTt (c˜). Fourth, suppose that all other cutoffs remained
fixed and cNt−k−1 and c
P
t−k−1 (for k ≥ 1) decrease. By MLRP, this shifts the distribu-
tion of signals at time t − k in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance and thus
given cNt−k and c
P
t−k, it increases zt−k(σ, h
t−k−1), shifting the distribution of signals at time
t − k + 1 in the sense of first-order static dominance. Applying this argument iteratively k
times, we conclude that supBRTt (c) ≥ supBRTt (c˜). This establishes that whenever c ≥ c˜,
supBRTt (c) ≥ supBRTt (c˜). The same argument also applies to semi-Markovian cutoffs.
Thus from Theorem 1 the set of pure strategy equilibria in cutoff strategies and set of pure
strategy semi-Markovian equilibria in cutoff strategies are nonempty complete lattices.
To complete the proof, we next show that greatest and least equilibria are semi-Markovian.
We provide the argument for the greatest equilibrium and the argument for the least is analo-
gous. It is clear that the overall greatest equilibrium is at least as high (with cutoffs at least as
low) as the greatest semi-Markov equilibrium since it includes such equilibria, so it is sufficient
to show that the greatest equilibrium is semi-Markovian. Thus, suppose to the contrary of
the claim that the greatest equilibrium, say c =
(
cN1 (h
0) , cP1 (h
0) , ...cNt (h
t−1) , cPt (h
t−1) , ...
)
,
is not semi-Markovian. This implies that that there exists some t (and T ∈ {P,N}) such
that cTt (h
t−1) > cTt
(
h˜t−1
)
where ht−1 and h˜t−1 have the same last prominent agent, say
occurring at time t− k. Then consider:
c˜ = (cN1 (h
0) , cP1 (h
0) ,... , cNt−k+1
(
ht−k
)
, cPt−k+1
(
ht−k
)
, c˜Nt−k+2
(
ht−k+1
)
, c˜Pt−k+2
(
ht−k+1
)
, ... c˜Nt (h
t−1) ,
c˜Pt (h
t−1) , cNt+1 (h
t) , cPt+1 (h
t) , ...), where
c˜Tt−k+j+1
(
ht−k+j
)
= min{ctt− k + j + 1T
(
h˜t−k+j
)
, cTt−k+j+1
(
ht−k+j
)} with h˜t−k+j and ht−k+j
are the truncated versions of histories h˜t−1 and ht−1. Next, it is straightforward to see that
c˜ is also an equilibrium. In particular, following history h˜t−1, c is an equilibrium by hypoth-
esis. Since the payoffs of none of the players after t− k directly depend on the action of the
prominent agents before the last one, this implies that when all agents after t − k switch
their cutoffs after history ht−k as in c˜, this is still an equilibrium. This shows that c˜ is an
equilibrium cutoff profile, but this contradicts that c is the greatest equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Part 1. First, note that if the greatest equilibrium is for all endogenous agents to play
High following a prominent play of High for some γ, then it is also the greatest equilibrium
39
for all lower γ. This follows from the monotonicity of best responses in γ. Thus, the set of
γ’s for which all endogenous agents playing High following the last prominent play being
High is the greatest equilibrium is an interval.
By the argument preceding (4), the cutoff γ for all endogenous agents to play High
following a prominent play of High is γ
H
as defined in (4) . It also follows that this is a
closed interval, since it is an equilibrium for γ = γ
H
, but not for any higher γ since then
High is not a best response conditional upon the lowest signal.
Thus, all endogenous agents playing High following the last prominent play being High
is the greatest equilibrium if and only if γ ∈ [0, γ
H
].
Consider next the set of γ’s for which all endogenous agents playing Low following the
last prominent play being High is the greatest equilibrium. Again from (3), if γ belongs to
this set, then any γ′ > γ also does. Let the cutoff γ be denoted γH , so all playing Low is
the greatest equilibrium if γ > γH , but not if γ < γH .
To complete the proof of Part 1 we need to show that the remaining interval (γ
H
, γH ]
is such that endogenous agents begin by playing High and then eventually play some Low.
The fact that the initial play when γ ∈ (γ
H
, γH) must be High follows from the proof of
Proposition 3.32 The fact that the intermediate interval must also involve some play of Low
then follows from the proof that all play of High is only an equilibrium if γ ≤ γ
H
.
Part 2. Proceeding similarly to Part 1, the set of γ’s such that in the greatest equilibrium
all endogenous agents play High following a prominent Low is an interval of the form [0, γ
L
],
where in this case γ
L
= λ (1− pi), since otherwise (3) would not be satisfied for an agent
immediately following a prominent Low.
Now take γ > γ
L
≡ λ (1− pi). This is sufficient for Low to be a strict best response
immediately following a prominent Low. But the next agent does not know for sure that the
previous generation played Low. If γ > γ
L
, then she expects her previous generation agent
to have played Low unless he was exogenously committed to High. This implies that it is
sufficient to consider the expectation of φtt−1 under this assumption and ensure that even
for the signal most favorable to the previous generation agent having played High, Low is a
best response. The threshold for this is
γ∗L ≡ (1− λ) Φ(1, pi) + λ (1− pi) . (A4)
Thus if γ > γ∗L > γL, this agent will also have a Low strict best response even in the
greatest equilibrium. Now we proceed inductively and conclude that this threshold applies
32The proof of Proposition 3 references this proposition, but there is no circularity as the reference is only
to the result a play of all High is an equilibrium following a prominent High if and only if γ ≤ γ
H
— a
result we have already established.
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to all future agents. Thus, when γ > γ∗L, all endogenous agents following a prominent Low
will play Low.
The threshold γL for which, in the greatest equilibrium all endogenous agents play Low
following a prominent play of Low satisfies γL ≤ γ∗L. Once again with a similar argument as
in Part 1, the set of γ’s for which the greatest equilibrium equilibrium involves all endogenous
agents playing Low following a prominent Low is an interval. An analogous argument as in
Part 1 for the remaining interval concludes the proof of Part 2.
In addition, we show that if γL ≤ γH (and thus a fortiori if γ∗L ≤ γH ), then γL = γ∗L,
thus establishing (6). We next prove this result.
Proof that γL ≤ γH implies γL = γ∗L. Suppose γL ≤ γH and consider the case where
γ = γL. Then following a High play of a prominent agent, all endogenous agents will play
High. Therefore, for an endogenous prominent agent to have Low as best response for any
signal and prior x, it has to be the case that (1− λ)Φ(1, x) + λ(1− pi) ≤ γL. Since γL ≤ γ∗L,
this implies
(1− λ)Φ(1, x) + λ(1− pi) ≤ γL ≤ (1− λ)Φ(1, pi) + λ(1− pi).
Therefore, Φ(1, x) ≤ Φ(1, pi), or equivalently x = pi as pi is the lowest possible prior of
previous agent playing High. Hence γL = γ
∗
L. This results also implies that when γ
∗
L ≤ γH ,
we also have γL = γ
∗
L. Then (7) is obtained by comparing the expressions for γH and γ
∗
L.
Proof of Proposition 3: We prove Parts 2 and 3, and the proof involves proving Part
1.
Part 2: Consider play following a prominent High, and consider strategies listed as
a sequence of cutoff thresholds
{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
for prominent and non-prominent players as
a function of the number of periods τ since the last prominent agent. We first show by
contradiction that
{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
must be non-decreasing. To do this, let us define a new
sequence
{
(CPτ , C
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
as follows:
CTτ = min
{
cTτ , c
T
τ+1
}
for T ∈ {P,N}. The sequences {(cPτ , cNτ )}∞τ=1 and {(CPτ , CNτ )}∞τ=1 coincide if and only if{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is non-decreasing. Moreover, since CTτ ≤ cTτ , if this is not the case, then there
exist some τ , T such that CTτ < c
T
τ .
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that there exist some τ , T such that CTτ < c
T
τ (and
for the rest of the proof fix T ∈ {P,N} to be this type). Define B(C) be the lowest best
response cutoff (for each τ , T ) to the sequence of strategies C. Since we have a game of weak
strategic complements as established in the proof of Proposition 1, B is a non-decreasing
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function. We will first show that B(C)Tτ ≤ CTτ for all τ and T (or that B(C) ≤ C), and
then we will show that in this case there exists an equilibrium C′ ≤ C. This will finally
yield a contradiction since either C = c or C 6= c, in which case c is not greater than C′,
contradicting the fact that c is the greatest equilibrium.
Let φττ−1(C, si) and φ
τ
τ+1(C, si) denote the beliefs under C of the last and next period
agents, respectively, playing High if the agent of generation τ plays High conditional upon
seeing signal si. Similarly, let φ
τ
τ−1(c, si) and φ
τ
τ+1(c, si) denote the corresponding beliefs
under c. If CTτ = c
T
τ , then since C ≤ c it follows that φττ−1(C) ≥ φττ−1(c) and φττ+1(C) ≥
φττ+1(c). This implies from (3) that
B(C)Tτ ≤ B(c)Tτ = cTτ = CTτ ,
where the second relation follows from the fact that c is the cutoff associated with the
greatest equilibrium. Thus, B(c) = c.
So, consider the case where CTτ = c
T
τ+1 < c
T
τ . We now show that also in this case
φττ−1(C, si) ≥ φτ+1τ (c, si) and φττ+1(C, si) ≥ φτ+1τ+2(c, si). First, φττ+1(C) ≥ φτ+1τ+2(c) follows
directly from the fact that CTτ+1 ≤ cTτ+2. Next to establish that φττ−1(C) ≥ φτ+1τ (c), it is
sufficient to show that the prior probability of High at time τ−1 under C, PC(aτ−1 = High),
is no smaller than the prior probability of High at time τ under c, Pc(aτ = High). We next
establish this:
Claim 2 PC(aτ−1 = High) ≥ Pc(aτ = High).
Proof. We prove this inequality by induction. It is clearly true for τ = 1 (since we start
with a prominent High). Next suppose it holds for t < τ , and we show that it holds for τ .
Note that
PC(at−1 = High) = (1− FH(CNτ−1))PC(aτ−2 = High) + (1− FL(CNτ−1))(1− PC(aτ−2 = High)),
Pc(aτ = High) = (1− FH(cNτ ))Pc(aτ−1 = High) + (1− FL(cNτ ))(1− Pc(aτ−1 = High))
Then we need to check that
(1− FH(CNτ−1))PC(aτ−2 = High) + (1− FL(CNτ−1))(1− PC(aτ−2 = High))
≥ (1− FH(cNτ ))Pc(aτ−1 = High) + (1− FL(cNτ ))(1− Pc(aτ−1 = High)).
By definition CNτ−1 ≤ cNτ , and therefore 1 − FH(CNτ−1) ≥ 1 − FH(cNτ ) and 1 − FL(CNτ−1) ≥
1− FL(cNτ ), so the following is a sufficient condition for the desired inequality:
(1− FH(cNτ ))PC(aτ−2 = High) + (1− FL(cNτ ))(1− PC(aτ−2 = High))
≥ (1− FH(cNτ ))Pc(aτ−1 = High) + (1− FL(cNτ ))(1− Pc(aτ−1 = High)).
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This in turn is equivalent to
(1−FH(cNτ ))[PC(aτ−2 = High)−Pc(aτ−1 = High)] ≥ (1−FL(cNτ ))[PC(aτ−2 = High)−Pc(aτ−1 = High)].
Since PC(aτ−2 = High)− Pc(aτ−1 = High) ≥ 0 by the induction hypothesis and FH(cNτ ) ≤
FL(c
N
τ ), this inequality is always satisfied, establishing the claim.
This claim thus implies that φττ−1(C) ≥ φτ+1τ (c). Together with φττ+1(C) ≥ φτ+1τ+2(c),
which we established above, this implies that B(C)Tτ ≤ B(c)Tτ+1. Then
B(C)Tτ ≤ B(c)Tτ+1 = cTτ+1 = CTτ ,
where the second relationship again follows from the fact that c is an equilibrium and the
third one from the hypothesis that CTτ = c
T
τ+1 < c
T
τ . This result completes the proof that
B(C) ≤ C. We next prove the existence of an equilibrium C′ ≤ C, which will finally enable
us to establish the desired contradiction.
Claim 3 There exists an equilibrium C′ such that C′ ≤ C ≤ c.
Proof. Consider the (complete) sublattice of points C′ ≤ C. Since B is a non-decreasing
function and takes all points of the sublattice into the sublattice (i.e., since B(C) ≤ C),
Tarski’s (1955) fixed point theorem implies that B has a fixed point C′ ≤ C, which is, by
construction, an equilibrium.
Now the desired contradiction is obtained by noting that if C 6= c, then c is not greater
than C′, contradicting the fact that c is the greatest equilibrium. This contradiction estab-
lishes that C = c, and thus that
{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is non-decreasing.
We next show that
{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is increasing when γ > γ
H
. Choose the smallest τ such
that cNτ > 0. This exists from Proposition 2 in view of the fact that γ > γH . By definition,
an endogenous agent in generation τ − 1 played High, whereas the agent in generation
τ + 1 knows, again by construction, that the previous generation will choose Low for some
signals. This implies that φττ−1 > φ
τ+1
τ , and moreover, φ
τ
τ+1 ≥ φτ+1τ+2 from the fact that the
sequence
{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is non-decreasing. This implies that (cPτ+1, c
N
τ+1) > (c
P
τ , c
N
τ ) (provided
the latter is not already (1,1)). Now repeating this argument for τ + 1,..., the result that{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is increasing (for γ > γ
H
) is established, completing the proof of Part 2.
Part 3: In this case, we need to show that the sequence
{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is non-increasing
starting from a prominent agent choosing Low. The proof is analogous, except that we now
define the sequence
{
(CPτ , C
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
with
CTτ = min
{
cTτ−1, c
T
τ
}
.
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Thus in this case, it follows that C ≤ c, and the two sequences coincide if and only if{
(cPτ , c
N
τ )
}∞
τ=1
is non-increasing. We define B (C) analogously. The proof that B (C) ≤ C is
also analogous. In particular, when CTτ = c
T
τ , the same argument establishes that
B(C)Tτ ≤ B(c)Tτ = cTτ = CTτ .
So consider the case where CTτ = c
T
τ−1 < c
T
τ . Then the same argument as above implies that
φττ+1(C) ≥ φτ−1τ (c). Next, we can also show that φττ−1(C) ≥ φτ−1τ−2(c) by establishing the
analogue of Claim 2.
Claim 4 PC(aτ = High) ≥ Pc(aτ−1 = High).
Proof. The proof is analogous to that of Claim 2 and is again by induction. The base step
of the induction is true in view of the fact that we now start with a Low prominent agent.
When it is true for t < τ , a condition sufficient for it to be also true for τ can again be
written as
(1−FH(cNτ−1))[PC(aτ−1 = High)−Pc(aτ−2 = High)] ≥ (1−FL(cNτ−1))[PC(aτ−1 = High)−Pc(aτ−2 = High)].
Since PC(aτ−1 = High)− Pc(aτ−2 = High) ≥ 0 and FH(cNτ−1) ≤ FL(cNτ−1), this inequality is
satisfied, establishing the claim.
This result now implies the desired relationship
B(C)Tτ ≤ B(c)Tτ−1 = cTτ−1 = CTτ .
Claim 3 still applies and completes the proof of Part 3.
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Appendix B: Additional Results — (Not for Publica-
tion)
6.1 Proofs of Propositions 4-6
Proof of Proposition 4: Part 1: Since γ ≥ γ˜L, the equilibrium involves all regular
agents choosing Low. Therefore, the most optimistic expectation would obtain when s = 1
and is Φ(1, pi). Following the prominent agent choosing High, the greatest equilibrium is
all subsequent endogenous agents (regular or prominent) choosing High (since γ ≤ γ
H
).
Therefore, it is a strict best response for the prominent agent to play High if s = 1 (since
γ < (1−λ)Φ(1, pi)+λ (1− pi) ≡ γ∗L). Therefore, there exists some c˜ < 1 such that it is still a
strict best response for the prominent agent to choose High following s > c˜. The threshold
signal c˜ is defined by
(1− λ)Φ(c˜, pi) + λ (1− pi) = γ, (B1)
or 0 if the left hand side is above γ for s = 0.
Part 2: This is similar to Part 1, except in this case, since γ < γ˜L, the greatest equilib-
rium involves regular agents eventually choosing High at least for some signals following the
last prominent agent having chosen Low. Thus, instead of using Φ(s˜, pi), the cutoff will be
based on Φ(s˜, xt), where xt > pi is the probability that the agent of generation t, conditional
on being non-prominent, chooses High. From Proposition 3, xt is either increasing with
time or sticks at 1− pi. Thus, the prominent agent’s cutoffs are decreasing.
Proof of Proposition 5: Consider the greatest equilibrium. We let ckt (λ, γ, fH , fL, pi)
denote the cutoff signal above which an endogenous agent born at time t 6= 2 plays High
under scenario k in the greatest equilibrium and as a function of the underlying setting.
As usual, for players t > 2 under scenarios 2′ and 3, this is conditional upon a High play
by the first agent, since that is the relevant situation for determining player 1’s decision to
play High (recall (3)). In scenarios 2 and 3, for agent 2 these will not apply since that
agent perfectly observes agent 1’s action; and so in those scenarios we explicitly specify the
strategy as a function of the observation of the first agent’s play.
As the setting (λ, γ, fH , fL, pi) is generally a given in the analysis below, we omit that
notation unless explicitly needed.
Step 1: We show that c2
′
1 ≤ c11, with strict inequality for some settings.
Consider the greatest equilibrium under scenario 1, with corresponding cutoffs for each
date t ≥ 1 of c1t . Now, consider beginning with the same profile of strategies under scenario
2′ where ĉ2
′
t = c
1
t for all t, (where recall that for t > 2 these are conditional on High play by
B-1
agent 1, and we leave those conditional upon Low play unspecified as they are inconsequential
to the proof).
Let xτ ∈ (0, 1) denote the prior probability that an agent born in period t > τ in scenario
1 assigns to the event that agent τ ≥ 2 plays High. Let xHτ denote the probability that an
agent born in period t > τ under scenario 2′ assigns to the event that agent τ ≥ 2 plays
High (presuming cutoffs ĉ2
′
t = c
1
t ) conditional upon agent t > τ knowing that agent 1 played
High (but not yet conditional upon t’s signal). It is straightforward to verify that by the
strict MLRP xHτ ≥ xτ for all τ ≥ 2, with strict inequality for τ = 2 if c12 ∈ (0, 1).
Under scenario 1, High is a best response to (c1τ )τ for agent t conditional upon signal s
if and only if
(1− λ)Φ(s, xt−1) + λφtt+1(c1t+1) ≥ γ
where φtt+1(c
1
t+1) is the expected probability that the next period agent will play High
conditional upon t doing so, given the specified cutoff strategy. Similarly, under scenario 2′,
High is a best response to (ĉ2
′
τ )τ for agent t conditional upon signal s if and only if
(1− λ)Φ(s, xHt−1) + λφtt+1(ĉ2
′
t+1) ≥ γ
Given that xHτ ≥ xτ , it follows that under scenario 2′, the best response to ĉ2′t = c1t for any
agent t ≥ 2 (conditional on agent 1 choosing High) is a weakly lower cutoff than ĉ2′t , and a
strictly lower cutoff for agent t = 3 if c12 ∈ (0, 1) and c13 ∈ (0, 1). Iterating on best responses,
as in the argument from Proposition 1, there exists an equilibrium with weakly lower cutoffs
for all agents. In the case where there is a strictly lower cutoff for agent 3, then this leads
to a strictly higher φ3(c
2′
3 ) and so a strictly lower cutoff for agent 2 provided c
1
2 ∈ (0, 1).
Iterating on this argument, if c11 ∈ (0, 1), this then leads to a strictly lower cutoff for agent 1.
Thus, the strict inequality for agent 1 for some settings follows from the existence in some
settings of an equilibrium in scenario 1 where the first three cutoffs are interior. This will
be established in Step 1b.
Step 1b: Under scenarios 1 and 2′, there exist settings such that the greatest equilibrium
has all agents using interior cutoffs c1t ∈ (0, 1) for all t.
First note that if
(1− λ)Φ(0, 1− pi) + λ(1− pi) < γ
then c1t > 0 and c
2′
t > 0 for all t, since even with the most optimistic prior probability of
past and future endogenous agents playing High, an agent will not want to choose High
conditional on the lowest signal. Similarly, if
(1− λ)Φ(1, pi) + λ(pi) > γ
B-2
then c1t < 1 and c
2′
t < 1 for all t since even with the most pessimistic prior probability of past
and future endogenous agents playing High, an agent will prefer to choose High conditional
on the highest signal. Thus it is sufficient that
(1− λ)Φ(1, pi) + λ(pi) > (1− λ)Φ(0, 1− pi) + λ(1− pi)
to have a setting where all cutoffs are interior in all equilibria. This corresponds to
(1− λ) [Φ(1, pi)− Φ(0, 1− pi)] > λ(1− 2pi).
It is thus sufficient to have Φ(1, pi) > Φ(0, 1 − pi) and a sufficiently small λ. It is straight-
forward to verify that Φ(1, pi) > Φ(0, 1− pi) for some settings: for sufficiently high values of
fL(0)/fH(0) and low values of fL(1)/fH(1), equation (2)) implies that Φ(0, 1−pi) approaches
0 and Φ(1, pi) approaches 1.
Step 2: We show that c31 ≤ c21, with strict inequality for some settings.
Consider the greatest equilibrium under scenario 2, with corresponding cutoffs for each
date t ≥ 1 of c2t . Now, consider a profile of strategies in scenario 3 where ĉ3t = c2t for all
t 6= 2 (where recall that this is now the play these agents would choose conditional upon a
prominent agent 1 playing High). Maintain the same period 2 agent’s strategy as a function
of the first agent’s play of High or Low. It is clear that in the greatest equilibrium under
scenario 2, agent 2’s strategy has at least as high an action after High than after Low, since
subsequent agent’s strategies do not react and the beliefs of the first period agent are strictly
higher. Let us now consider the best responses of all agents to this profile of strategies. The
only agent whose information has changed across the scenarios is agents 3 and above, and are
now conditional upon agent 1 playing High. This leads to a (weakly) higher prior probability
that agent 2 played High conditional upon seeing agent 1 playing High, than under scenario
2 where agent 1’s play was unobserved. This translates into a weakly higher posterior of
High play for agent 3 for any given signal. This leads to a new best response for player 3
that involves a weakly lower cutoff. Again, the arguments from Proposition 1 extend and
there exists an equilibrium with weakly lower cutoffs for all agents (including agent 1), and
weakly higher probabilities of High for agent 2.
The strict inequality in this case comes from a situation described as follows. Consider
a setting such that γ = γ
H
> γL (which exist as discussed following Proposition ??), so
that the greatest equilibrium is such that all endogenous agents play High after a prominent
High and Low after a prominent Low. Set x0 < 1− pi. Under scenario 3, for large enough
x0, it follows that c
3
1 satisfies (1 − λ)Φ(c31, x0) + λ(1 − pi) = γ. Since γ = γH , this requires
that Φ(c31, x0) = Φ(0, 1 − pi). It follows that c31 > 0 and approaches 0 (and so is strictly
interior) as x0 approaches 1− pi, and approaches 1 for small enough x0.
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Now consider the greatest equilibrium under scenario 2, and let us argue that c21 > c
3
1
for some such settings. We know that c21 ≥ c31 from the proof above, and so suppose to the
contrary that they are equal. Note that the prior probability that an endogenous agent at
date 3 has that agent 2 plays High under scenario 2 is less than 1− pi, since an endogenous
agent 2 plays High at most with the probability that agent 1 does, which is less than 1− pi
given that c21 = c
3
1 > 0 and can be driven to pi for small enough x0 (as then c
3
1 goes to 1).
Given that γ = γ
H
, it then easily follows that agent 3 must have a cutoff c23 > 0 in the
greatest equilibrium. Let x23 < 1− pi be the corresponding probability that agent 3 will play
High following a High play by agent 2 under the greatest equilibrium in scenario 2. For
agent 2 to play High following High by agent 1, it must be that
(1− λ) + λx23 > γ.
There are settings for which γ = γ
H
> γL and yet (1 − λ) + λx23 < γ when x23 is less than
(1 − pi) (simply taking λ to be large enough, which does not affect sufficient conditions for
γ = γ
H
> γL). This then means that an endogenous agent 2 must play Low even after a
High play by agent 1. It then follows directly that an endogenous agent 1 will choose to
play Low regardless of signals, which contradicts the supposition that c21 ≥ c31.
Step 3: We show that c31 ≤ c2′1 , with strict inequality for some settings.
This is similar to the cases above, noting that if agent 2 under scenario 2′ had any
probability of playing High (so that c2
′
2 < 1, and otherwise the claim is direct), then it is a
best response for agent 2 to play High conditional upon observing High play by the agent
1 under scenario 3 and presuming the other players play their scenario 2′ strategies. Then
iterating on best replies leads to weakly lower cutoffs. Again, the strict conclusion follows
whenever the greatest equilibrium under scenario 2′ was such that c2
′
1 ∈ (0, 1) and c2′2 ∈ (0, 1).
The existence of settings where that is true follows from Step 1b which establishes sufficient
conditions for all cutoffs in all equilibria under scenario 2′ to be interior.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Part 1: The argument in the text establishes that if (and only if) γ ≤ γn
H
, there is a
greatest equilibrium that involves High for all s, T and all τ > 0, with γn
H
given by (9),
which also shows that this threshold is increasing in n. Similarly, an argument similar to that
in the proof of Proposition 2 establishes that if (and only if) γ > γnH , following a prominent
Low the greatest equilibrium involves Low for all s, T and all τ > 0.
We next prove that γnL is decreasing in n when γ
n
H
≥ γnL. Let γn,∗L be the equivalent of
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the threshold γ∗L defined in (5) with n agents within a generation:
γn,∗L ≡ (1− λ)
[
1
n
Φ(1, pi) +
n− 1
n
pi
]
+ λ(1− pi),
which is clearly decreasing in n. With the same argument that γL ≤ γH implies γL = γ∗L as
in the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that when γn
H
≥ γnL, γnL = γn,∗L . Thus, when γnH ≥ γnL,
γnL is also decreasing in n.
Finally, we prove that γnL is non-increasing in the case where there are no prominent agents
after the initial period (i.e., q = 0). Suppose the initial prominent agent chose Low. Let the
greatest equilibrium cutoff strategy profile with n agents be cn [a] = (cn1 [a] , c
n
2 [a] , c
n
3 [a] , ...).
Let BnLow (c) be the smallest cutoffs (thus corresponding to the greatest potential equilibrium)
following a prominent a = Low in the initial period that are best responses to the profile c.
We also denote cutoffs corresponding to all Low (following a prominent Low) by c¯n+1 [ Low].
We will show that BnLow (c¯
n+1 [ Low] ) ≤ c¯n+1 [Low] = Bn+1Low (c¯n+1 [Low]). Since BnLow is
monotone, for parameter values for which there is an all Low greatest equilibrium with n+1
agents it must have a fixed point in the sublattice defined as c ≤ c¯n+1 [Low]. Since c¯n+1 [Low]
is the greatest equilibrium with n+1 agents (following prominent Low in the initial period),
this implies that (for parameter values for which there is an all Low greatest equilibrium
with n+ 1 agents) with n agents, there is a greater equilibrium (with no greater cutoffs for
non-prominent and prominent agents) following prominent Low, establishing the result.
The following two observations establish that BnLow (c¯
n+1 [Low]) ≤ Bn+1Low (c¯n+1 [Low]) and
complete the proof. First, let φττ+1(n, c) be the posterior that a random (non-prominent)
agent from the next generation plays High conditional on the generation τ agent in question
playing High when cutoffs are given by c and there are n agents within a generation. Then
for any τ and any c, φττ+1(n, c) ≥ φττ+1(n + 1, c) since a given signal generated by High is
less likely to be observed with n+ 1 agents than with n agents (when there is no prominent
agent in the current generation, and of course equally likely when there is a prominent agent
in the current generation).
Second, let φττ−1(s, n, c¯
n+1 [Low]) be the posterior that a random (non-prominent) agent
from the previous generation has played High when the current signal is s, the last prominent
agent has played Low and cutoffs are given by c¯n+1 [Low] (i.e., all Low following initial
prominent Low). Then φττ−1(s, n, c¯
n+1 [Low]) ≥ φττ−1(s, n + 1, c¯n+1 [Low]). This simply
follows since when all endogenous agents are playing Low, a less noisy signal will lead to
higher posterior that High has been played.
Part 2: The result that when γ ≤ γn,m
H
an endogenous agent seeing a prominent High
in the previous generation will play High also follows directly from the argument in the
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text. Given this, it is straightforward that when γ ≤ γn,m
H
, all endogenous agents the next
generations will also play High follows immediately. The argument following a prominent
Low is similar.
Uniqueness
To provide conditions for uniqueness, let us define an additional threshold that is the High
action counterpart of the threshold γ∗L introduced above:
γ∗H ≡ (1− λ)Φ(0, 1− pi) + λpi.
This is the expectation of (1−λ)φtt−1+λφtt+1 conditional upon the signal s = 0 (most adverse
to High play) when endogenous agents have played High until now and are expected to play
Low from next period onwards. When γ < γ∗H , regardless of expectations about the future
and the signal, High play is the unique best response for all endogenous agents following
High prominent play.
Proposition 7 1. If γ < γ∗H , then following a prominent a = High, the unique con-
tinuation equilibrium involves all (prominent and non-prominent) endogenous agents
playing High.
2. If γ > γ∗L, then following a prominent a = Low, the unique continuation equilibrium
involves all (prominent and non-prominent) endogenous agents playing Low.
3. If γ∗L < γ < γ
∗
H , then there is a unique equilibrium driven by the starting condition:
all endogenous agents take the same action as the action of the last prominent agent.
Proof : We only prove the first claim. The proof of the second claim is analogous. Consider
τ = 1 (the agent immediately after the prominent agent). For this agent, we have φ10 = 1
and the worst expectations concerning the next agent that he or she can have is φ12 = pi.
Thus from (3) in the text, γ < γ∗H is sufficient to ensure σ
SM
1 (a = High, ·, N) = High. Next
consider τ = 2. Given the behavior at τ = 1, z1(σ,High) = 1 − pi, and thus the worst
expectations, consistent with equilibrium, are φ21 =
1−pi
1−pi+pi/m and φ
2
3 = pi. Thus from (3),
(1− λ) (1− pi)
1− pi + pi/m + λpi ≥ γ,
or γ < γ∗H is sufficient to ensure that the best response is σ
SM
2 (a = High, ·, N) = High.
Applying this argument iteratively, we conclude that the worst expectations are φττ−1 =
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1−pi
1−pi+pi/m and φ
τ
τ+1 = pi, and thus γ < γ
∗
H is sufficient to ensure that the best response is
σSMτ (a = High, ·, N) = High.
The condition that γ∗L < γ < γ
∗
H boils down to
λ(1− 2pi) < (1− λ) [Φ(0, 1− pi)− Φ(1, pi)] ,
which is naturally stronger than condition (7) in the text which was necessary and sufficient
for γ∗L < γH . In particular, in addition to (7), this condition also requires that λ be
sufficiently small, so that sufficient weight is placed on the past. Without this, behavior
would coordinate with future play, which naturally leads to a multiplicity.33
Comparative Statics
We now present some comparative static results that show the role of forward versus back-
ward looking behavior and the information structure on the likelihood of different types of
social norms.
We first study how changes in λ, which capture how forward-looking the agents are,
impact the likelihood of social norms involving High and Low play. Since we do not have
an explicit expression for γL, we focus on the impact of λ on γH and γ
∗
L (recall that γL = γ
∗
L
when γL ≤ γH).
Proposition 8 1. γ
H
is increasing in λ; i.e., all High endogenous play following High
prominent play occurs for a larger set of parameters as agents become more forward-
looking.
2. There exists M∗ such that γ∗L is increasing [decreasing] in λ if M < M
∗ [if M > M∗],
i.e., Low play as the unique equilibrium following Low prominent play occurs for a
larger set of parameters as agents become more forward-looking provided that signals
more likely under High are sufficiently distinguishing.
Proof of Proposition 8: From the definition of γ
H
,
∂γH
∂λ
= 1− pi − Φ (0, 1− pi) .
Since Φ (0, 1− pi) = (1− pi) / (1− pi + pi/m) < 1− pi, the first part follows.
33Note that in parts 1 and 2 of this proposition, with a slight abuse of terminology, a “unique continuation
equilibrium” implies that the equilibrium is unique until a new exogenous prominent agent arrives. For
example, if γ < γ∗H and γ ≤ γ∗L, the play is uniquely pinned down after a prominent High only until a
prominent Low, following which there may be multiple equilibrium strategy profiles.
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For the second part, note that
∂γ∗L
∂λ
= 1− pi − Φ(1, pi) = 1− pi − pi
pi + (1− pi)/M .
As M → ∞, 1 − pi − Φ(1, pi) → 1 − 2pi < 0, and as M → 0, pi − Φ(1, pi) → 1− pi > 0.
Therefore, there exists M∗ such that 1− pi − Φ(1, pi) = 0, and
∂γ∗L
∂λ
> 0 if and only if M < M∗.
Intuitively, the first result follows because γ
H
is the threshold for the greatest equilibrium
to involve High following a prominent agent who chooses High. A greater λ increases the
importance of coordinating with the next generation, and this enables the choice of High
being sustained by expectations of future agents choosing High.
The second part focuses on the effects of λ on γ∗L. Recall that the greatest equilibrium
involves a social norm of Low if this is the unique (continuation) equilibrium. As λ increases,
more emphasis is placed on expectations of agents’ play tomorrow relative to interpreting
past signals. Whether this makes it easier or harder to coordinate on a Low social norm
depends on how accurate the past signals are regarding potential information that might
upset the coordination – accurate signals regarding past High can upset all Low play as
an equilibrium. Thus, when past signals are sufficiently accurate, more forward looking
preferences (i.e., higher λ) make the Low social norm following Low prominent play more
likely.
The next proposition gives comparative statics with respect to the probability of the
exogenous types, pi.
Proposition 9 1. γ
H
is decreasing in pi; i.e., exclusively High play following High
prominent play occurs for a smaller set of parameter values as the probability of exoge-
nous types increases.
2. For every λ there is a threshold p¯iλ such that for pi > p¯iλ, γ
∗
L is decreasing in pi, and
for pi < p¯iλ, γ
∗
L is increasing in pi. Moreover, p¯iλ is decreasing in λ.
Proof of Proposition 9: For the first part, just recall that γ
H
≡ (1− λ) Φ(0, 1 − pi) +
λ (1− pi), which is decreasing in pi. The second part follows as
∂γ∗L
∂pi
= −λ+ (1− λ)/M
(1/M + pi(1− 1/M))2 ,
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which is decreasing in pi (for given λ) and decreasing in λ, establishing the desired result.
The results in this proposition are again intuitive. A higher pi implies that there is a
higher likelihood of an exogenous type committed to Low and this makes it more difficult
to maintain the greatest equilibrium with all endogenous agents playing High (following a
prominent agent who has chosen High). For the second part, recall that we are trying to
maintain an equilibrium in which all endogenous agents playing Low following a prominent
Low is the unique equilibrium. A lower probability of types exogenously committed to High
makes this more likely provided that agents put sufficient weight on the past, so that the
main threat to a Low social norm comes from signals indicating that the previous generation
has played High (and this is captured by the condition that pi > p¯iλ, where p¯iλ is decreasing
in λ). Otherwise (i.e., if pi < p¯iλ) the unique equilibrium requires all agents choosing Low
in order to target payoffs from (Low,Low) when they are matched with an exogenous type
committed to Low in the next generation. Naturally in this case a higher pi makes this more
likely.
The next proposition summarizes some implications of the signals structure becoming
more informative. Comparing two information settings (fL, fH) and (f̂L, f̂H), we say that
signals become more informative if there exists s¯ ∈ (0, 1) with f̂H(s)
f̂L(s)
> fH(s)
fL(s)
for all s > s¯ and
f̂H(s)
f̂L(s)
< fH(s)
fL(s)
for all s < s¯.
Proposition 10 Suppose that signals become more informative from (fL, fH) to (f̂L, f̂H),
and consider a case such that γ˜L ≤ γ < min {γ∗L, γH} both before and after the change in
the distribution of signals. If 1 > c˜ > s¯ (where c˜ is the original threshold as defined in
Proposition 4), then the likelihood that a prominent agent will break a Low social norm (play
High if the last prominent play was Low) increases in the greatest equilibrium.
Prominent agents break the Low social norm when they believe that there is a sufficient
probability that the agent in the previous generation chose High (and anticipating that they
can switch the play to High given their visibility). The proposition follows because when
signals become more precise near the threshold s¯ where prominent agents are indifferent
between sticking with and breaking the Low social norm, the probability that they will
obtain a signal greater than s¯ increases. This increases the likelihood that they would prefer
to break the Low social norm.
Proof of Proposition 10: Recall that c˜ is defined in the proof of Proposition 4 as
(1− λ) pi
pi + (1− pi) fL(c˜)
fH(c˜)
+ λ(1− pi) = γ.
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Consider a shift in the likelihood ratio as specified in the proposition, i.e., a change to
f̂L(s)/f̂H(s) < fL(s)/fH(s) (since c˜ > s¯) and ensuring that we remain in Part 1 of Proposition
4. Because f̂L(s)/f̂H(s) is strictly decreasing by the strict MLRP, the left-hand side increases,
and c˜ decreases. This implies that the likelihood that a the prominent agent will break the
Low social norm increases.
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